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MULTI-TORT CASES: CAUSE FOR MORE
DARKNESS ON THE SUBJECT, OR A NEW

ROLE FOR FEDERAL COMMON LAW?
GEORGENE M. VAIRO*
INTRODUCTION

AGENT Orange, asbestos, DES, the Dalkon Shield and toxic wastes
ItVare only a few of the contributors to a growing national phenomenon: mass tort or "multi-tort" litigation.' Products liability cases,2 in* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, New York; B.A.
1972, Sweet Briar College; M. Ed. 1974, University of Virginia; J.D. 1979, Fordham
University School of Law; Law Clerk to the Honorable Joseph M. McLaughlin, U.S.D.C.
(E.D.N.Y.). I would like to thank Stephen Fogerty for his research assistance.
1. During the past twenty years, a new type of litigation has assumed the sobriquet
"mass tort" See Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 390 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated,
100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983); Trangsrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass Tort Litigation,
70 Cornell L. Rev. 779, 780-81 (1985). One type of mass tort is the mass accident, such
as a plane crash or other single occurrence that kills or injures many people. The result is
potential liability for many defendants including the airline, an airport, a governmental
agency and the manufacturers of the aircraft and its components. See, e.g., In re Air
Crash Disaster at Washington D.C. on Jan. 13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983); In
re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 500 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ill.
1980), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878
(1981); In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass. on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D.
Mass. 1975). See generally Note, The Casefor a FederalCommon Law ofAircraft Disaster Litigation: A JudicialSolution to a National Problem, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 231 (1976).
The cases arising out of the collapse of the skywaks in the central lobby of the Hyatt
Regency Hotel in Kansas City, which killed 114 people, are another example of mass
accident torts. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). Other examples of mass accident
cases are compiled in Trangsrud, supra, at 780 n.3.
This Article, however, is not concerned with mass accident cases that involve a tort
occurring in one jurisdiction. Nor does it necessarily address cases like those arising out
of the Bhopal/Union Carbide methyl isocyanate accident in which over 2000 people were
killed and thousands injured, Amended Consolidated Complaint & Jury Demand § 47, at
14, In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1985), when a cloud of methyl isocyanate leaked and passed over the
residences of thousands living near the Union Carbide plant in India. Id. " 16 at 5.
Rather, it concerns a second kind of mass tort case: products liability or toxic tort cases
in which a particular product or substance used or sold in interstate or international
commerce causes injury at different times to persons located in many areas of the United
States or the world. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d
Cir. 1980) (exposure to herbicides), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Jaffee v. United
States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.) (radiation exposure), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); In
re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (asbestos exposure); In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (contraceptive use), vacatedand remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 464 F.
Supp. 949 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979) (defective vaccine); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F.
Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (DES drug); see also S. Rep. No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (discussion of problems associated with hazardous wastes and suggested legal remedies) [hereinafter cited as Superfund Study]; Rheingold, The MER/29 Stor-An In-
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surance coverage disputes,3 and, increasingly, bankruptcy cases, 4
involving these and other products and substances are flooding the federal courts in an ever-increasing volume.'
stance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 116, 116-48 (1968)
(discussing the history and implications of the MER/29 prescription drug litigation).
These cases will be referred to as mass tort or "multi-tort" cases. The key distinction
between these cases and mass accident cases is the national, and possibly international,
scope of harm allegedly caused by the same or similar defective products or substances
caused over a period of time.
2. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1128 (1981); Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
3. Because most victims were exposed to the product more than twenty years before
manifesting an illness, an issue in the asbestos litigation was which insurance company, if
any, was obligated to defend and indemnify the manufacturer for thousands of claims.
See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(6000 suits), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1980) (over 1370 suits), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1109 (1981); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110,
111 (D. Mass. 1981) (approximately 5500 suits), affid as modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983); Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and
PoliticalIssues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 573, 709-30 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Asbestos Project]; Note, AdjudicatingAsbestos InsuranceLiability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 739, 740-48 (1984); Comment, Insurers
Liability in the Asbestos Disease Context-Application of the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. Rev. 239, 241-43 (1982). In fact, a "megatrial" began on March 4,
1985 in San Francisco, California against 75 insurers over illegal denial of coverage for
asbestos claims. See Nat'l L.J., March 25, 1985, at 35, col. 1. The lawsuits involve "multibillions" in damages. Id. The trial is being conducted in a high school auditorium
because over 96 law firms are involved. Id.
4. Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions have been filed by at least three asbestos manufacturers. See Asbestos Project, supra note 3, at 808. In addition, A.H. Robins Company, the maker of the Dalkon Shield, filed for bankruptcy on August 21, 1985 in the
bankruptcy court in Richmond, Virginia, because the company feared that the claims and
damage awards resulting from the Dalkon Shield threatened its viability. Diamond, Robins, In Bankruptcy Filing, Cites Dalkon Shield Claims, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at A1,
col. 1.
5. The statistics are staggering. In the five years between 1978 and 1983, the number
of products liability cases filed in federal courts has more than doubled, see Admin. Office
of U.S. Courts, 1983 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts 122, 129-31, and at least ten thousand new cases are likely to be
filed each year, see id. at 129. The number of products liability cases filed in the United
States district courts increased another 20.6% between 1983 and 1984. See Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 1984 Annual Report of the Director of the Admin. Office of the
United States Courts 131. The number of lawsuits is likely to climb further because
approximately 60 to 70 percent of cancers are attributable to various environmental contaminants. See S. Rep. No. 94-698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4491, 4494; Comment, Pursuing a Cause of Action in Hazardous
Waste Pollution Cases, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 533, 537 (1980). In addition, the effects of
modern chemicals may be passed from parent to child. See Hilts, Chemicals at Parent's
Job May Cause Child's Tumor, Wash. Post, July 3, 1982, at A8, col. 1. Extrapolations
from one study indicated that chemical exposures of parents might account for as many
as a quarter of all childhood brain tumors. See id. Thousands of new substances and
products are registered and developed each year. "The government's 1978 Registry of
Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances carried data on 7500 new products. In 1979, the
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As hazardous substances increasingly infiltrate our environment and
the number of multi-tort cases correspondingly rises, plaintiffs, defendants and the courts are confronted with many difficult issues not
presented in conventional single incident tort cases.6 Many of the issues
arise because multi-tort litigation involves large numbers of claimants
Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) prepared a supplement to the Federal Inventory of Chemicals in Commerce that would add about 3000 products to the more than
43,000 chemicals already in that catalog." Special Comm. on the Tort Liab. Sys.,
A.B.A., Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury: The Continuing Creation of a System of
Substantive Justice in American Tort Law 11-53 (1984) (citing 1978 Registry of Toxic
Effects CMA Chemical Safety Guide Available, 3 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1320 (1979)
and EPA PreparesInventory Supplement Which Includes 3,000 More Chemicals, 3 Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1311 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as Jurisprudence of Injury]. A study of
670 New Jersey water wells showed pesticides in 31 wells, toxic chemicals in Ill and
potentially harmful metals in 29. See Hanley, New JerseyStruggles to Tame Toxic Monster, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1982, at E6, col. 1. More recently, a United States congressional survey revealed that toxic chemicals are being released into the air by chemical
companies at far higher levels and at many more locations than previously thought. See
Diamond, Very High Levels of Toxic Materialsare Found in Air, N.Y. Times, March 26,
1985, at Al, col. 3. No uniform regulations control emissions of most of the substances,
and no regulations at all control others. See id. Even industry members believe uniform
federal regulation of such emissions is appropriate. See Shabecoff, Industry Chiefs Back
U.S. Curbs on Polluted Air, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1985, at Al, cal. 5. See generally
Note, Common Law and the Toxic Tort: Where Does Superfund Leave the Private Victim
of Toxic Torts?, 86 Dick L. Rev. 725, 725 (1982) (inadequacy of law dealing with hazardous waste accidents) [hereinafter cited as Common Law and the Toxic Tort]. As the
volume of toxic waste mounts, the number of persons sustaining serious injuries will continue to rise. In 1981 alone, the United States was confronted with the problem of determining how to dispose of 150 million metric tons of hazardous wastes. See Jurisprudence
of Injury, supra, at 11-53 to -54 (citing EP.A. Study Says Four Times More Waste GeneratedAnnually Than Previously Thought, 7 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 755 (1983)). In fact,
a United States government report commissioned by the E.P.A. in response to the Bhopal
disaster concluded that over 6928 accidents involving chemicals occurred in the United
States within the last five years, killing over 135 people and injuring another 1500. Diamond, U.S. Toxic Mishaps in Chemicals Put at 6,928 in 5 Years, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1985, at Al, col. 1. The most striking manifestation of the impact of the "toxics" problem on the legal system appears in the case of asbestos. Estimates that as many as seven
to ten percent of persons exposed to that product will die of cancer illustrate the social
dimensions of asbestos-caused illness. See Compensation Bills Forthcomingfor AsbestosRelated Diseases, 8 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 831, 832 (1978) (testimony of Donald IL Austin,
California Resource for Cancer Epidemiology and the California Tumor Registry). As
many as 30,000 suits for diseases allegedly related to asbestos have been filed. Asbestos
Project, supra note 3, at 580. Suits will continue to be filed at the rate of 500 per month.
Id. at 580-81. Thus, while agent orange and asbestos have so far been the subject of the
most notorious toxic tort cases, a litigation time bomb lurks in the toxic waste arena.
6. For example, a special study group created by the superfund legislation,
Superfund Law, § 301(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e) (1982), found that existing statutory remedies for environmental pollution were inadequate. Superfund Section 301(e) Study
Group, Injuries and Damages From Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of
Legal Remedies, A Report to Congress in Compliance With Section (e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (P.L 96-510),
Part I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1982). The study group noted that state or federal statutes providing relief for pollution-caused injuries were rare and extremely limited. See id.
The group determined that state common law is a plaintiff's primary remedy. See id. at
130. Yet even in those cases, "a private litigant [may] face substantial substantive and
procedural barriers in an action to recover damages for personal injury or property dam-
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throughout the United States and the world who have been exposed to
the same chemical agent or injured by the same product over a period of
time. Moreover, the claimants' illnesses frequently do not manifest
themselves until years after the exposure.7 Indeed, the filing of bankruptcy petitions by asbestos and other product manufacturers demonstrates the tremendous exposure and scope of harm, both present and
age due to hazardous wastes, particularly where the individual claims are relatively small.
Id.
Many commentators deplore the inadequacy of existing remedies for injuries caused by
defective products and toxic substances. See, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liabilityfor Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 859, 887 (1981); Rosenberg,
The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 859 (1984); Common Law and the Toxic Tort, supra note 5, at
726-31; Comment, "Close Encounters of the Toxic Kind'"--Toward an Amelioration of
Substantive and ProceduralBarriersfor Latent Toxic Injury Plaintiffs, 54 Temp. L.Q.
822, 850-52 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Close Encounters]; Note, Tort Actionsfor Cancer:
Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental Carcinogenesis,90 Yale L.J. 840, 851-52
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Tort Actions]. These articles contain specific ideas for dealing
with toxic lawsuits. One commentary, for example, proposes a "catalog of carcinogenic
substances and their dose-response curves," Tort Actions, supra, at 855, which would
serve as the basis for shifting the burden of proof to makers of carcinogens to show that
exposure to a threshold amount of a substance did not cause the plaintiff's cancer. See id.
Another author suggests that the Superfund legislation supports the development of an
implied private right of action on a strict liability theory. See Common Law and the
Toxic Tort, supra note 5, at 746. Other writers advocate modifying the technical requirements of the law of trespass and nuisance. See Close Encounters,supra, at 850-53.
Professor Rosenberg suggests that in mass toxic tort cases, liability proportioned to
statistical probabilities would be more just than liability based on an individualized imposition of traditional proof standards requiring a preponderance of the evidence. See Rosenberg, supra, at 859. Because this rule confronts firms with an expected liability that
"equals the losses attributable to their tortious conduct," id. at 866, Rosenberg argues
that by thus "giving firms precisely the incentives needed to induce them to take optimal
care, such a rule enables the system to achieve its optimal deterrence objective." Id.
Questioning "the entire notion that 'particularistic' evidence differs in some significant
qualitative way from statistical evidence," id. at 870, Rosenberg criticizes the idea "that
there exists a form of proof that can provide direct and actual knowledge of the causal
relationship between the defendant's tortious conduct and the plaintiff's injury." Id.
In some situations involving large numbers of injury victims, negotiated arrangements
have avoided costly and protracted litigation. For example, the establishment of a settlement fund for a group of asbestos claimants hastened disposition of 680 claims, with five
asbestos firms and insurance companies making significant contributions to the fund. See
Settlement Fundfor Asbestos Claims Established UnderNew JerseyAgreement, 10 O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA) 1367, 1367 (1981). The fund was placed under court supervision to enhance
efficiency. Id.
7. See supra note 3. Accordingly, multi-tort litigation presents the spectre of huge
damage awards, the difficulty of establishing responsibility for the acts of corporate officials who have long disappeared from the picture, and the uncertainties associated with
proving causation. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 855-59. Commentators have discussed
the problems facing litigants in proving causation. See, e.g., Superfund Study, supra note
1, at 70-7 1; Comment, Pursuinga Cause of Action in Hazardous Waste Pollution Cases,
29 Buffalo L. Rev. 533, 540-43 (1980); Note, Tort Actionsfor Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation and Environmental Carcinogenesis,90 Yale L.J. 840, 854 (1981). Chief Judge
Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York confronted this problem in the Agent Orange Litigation. See Preliminary Memorandum and
Order in Settlement, In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. 381, slip op. at
103-50 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1984).
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anticipated, caused by multi-torts.8
Other more basic questions persist: When does the cause of action
accrue?9 What is the appropriate standard of liability?'" Should an enterprise liability theory be applied?"
Should punitive damages be
awarded?' z These questions involve serious legal, economic and social
implications that seem to demand uniform solutions because the harm is
inflicted on persons nationwide. Although consistency of result is a legitimate goal of any legal system,' 3 the existing answers to these questions
vary from state to state. 4 The result is a clash of concepts at the core of
8. See supra note 4. These filings raise the additional problem of obtaining compensation for future claimants who are afflicted by disease or injury, but whose share of
available corporate funds may be diminished severely or wiped out entirely by judgments
in favor of earlier victims or creditors of the corporation. Cf Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-42 (2d Cir. 1967) (fearing that large punitive damage
award in one case may diminish corporate assets and thereby preclude recovery by other
plaintiffs in subsequent litigation).
9. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 800 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aft'd, 760
F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985).
10. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087-88 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F.
Supp. 740, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
11. See Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1598 (1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F.
Supp. 740, 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
12. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 850 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1983). For a
discussion of the use of punitive damages in this context, see Seltzer, Punitive Damages in
Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52
Fordham L. Rev. 37 (1983).
13. See, eg., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 597, 249 N.E.2d 394, 411-12, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519, 543 (1969) (Breitel, J., dissenting). See generally Brunet, A Study in the
Allocation of Scarce Resources: The Efficiency of FederalIntervention Criteria, 12 Ga. L
Rev. 701, 710-11 (1978) (increase in judicial workload has increased attention on the
number of cases decided, possibly at the expense of the quality of the decisions); Note,
Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 Harv. L Rev. 1143,
1144 (1983) (multiple adjudications in mass accident litigation may result in inconsistent
decisions).
14. For example, the statute of limitations rule in these cases varies from state to
state. In some states the cause of action accrues at the time of discovery, see. eg., G.D.
Searle v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1975) (Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 340 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984) provides one year for personal injury
action); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky.
1979) (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1984) provides accrual from date of discovery of injury; id, § 340.2 (West 1982) provides one year for
asbestos actions), while other states have adopted a time-of-injury rule, see, eg., N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Law § 214(5) (McKinney 1972) (three years for personal injury); Va. Code
§ 8.01-243 (1984) (two years for personal injury actions); id § 8.01-230 (accrual takes
place at time of injury, not time of discovery). Finally, some states have adopted special
statutes of limitations for injuries from specific toxic substances. See, eg., N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Law § 214(b) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85) (for diseases from Agent Orange, two
years from date of discovery); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Page Supp. 1984) (two
years from time of discovery when injury is caused by asbestos, chromium, or, for Vietnam veterans, Agent Orange). For a review of state product liability and personal injury
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our system of government.
In the context of our federal system, each state is permitted to deter-

mine its own approach to tort issues. Thus, federalism prevents litigants
involved in cases distributed throughout the country from obtaining uniform results. Congress, on the other hand, has enacted numerous statutes 5 regulating many of the products and substances causing the harm
in multi-tort cases. One would think that the supremacy of federal interests embodied in these statutes should play some role in determining the
outcome of multi-tort litigation.
Since Erie Railroadv. Tompkins,' 6 however, it has been axiomatic that
federal courts sitting in private products liability or negligence cases
must apply the substantive law of the states in which they sit."7 This
requirement promotes the idea of federalism. Nevertheless, applying the
Erie doctrine in multi-tort cases raises fundamental questions of fairness,

and sets the stage for a collision between the policies embodied by federalism and those behind the supremacy of national interests when Congress regulates dangerous substances and products. This Article argues
that the continued unquestioned application of Erie in multi-tort litigation ignores both the national aspects of these cases and the federal policies and interests involved. To solve the confused state of multi-tort
litigation, this Article proposes that the best of Swift v. Tyson' 8 be resurstatutes of limitations, see Note, Toward a Time-of-Discovery Rule for the Statute of Limitations in Latent Injury Cases in New York State, 13 Fordham Urb. L.J. 113 (1985).
15. See infra note 45.
16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17. The Erie Doctrine refers to the line of cases holding that state law must be applied
in federal courts absent some federal law on the subject. The key cases comprising the
doctrine are Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945), Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), and Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Each case recognizes the primacy of state substantive law
in diversity actions and other cases in which a federal law does not control. See Hanna,
380 U.S. at 467; Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536-37; GuarantyTrust, 326 U.S. at 109; Erie, 304 U.S.
at 78. See infra Part I. In addition, the Court in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941), held that a federal court in a diversity case must apply the choice of
law rules prevailing in the state where the court is located. See id. at 496. The Court
stated:
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within
the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts to thwart
such local policies by enforcing an independent "general law" of conflict of
laws. Subject only to review by this Court on any federal question that may
arise, Delaware is free to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by
the law of the forum or some other law.
Id. at 496-97. If a federal case is transferred on the request of the defendant pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1982), the transferee court must apply the law of the transferor court.
See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964). This rule evolved to prevent defendants from defeating the advantages that flow from forum state law to plaintiffs who
have chosen a proper forum. See id. at 633-34.
18. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In Swift, Justice Story wrote that federal courts could
freely exercise independent judgment on what the common law should be. See id. at 18.
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rected 19 so that federal common law may be applied in appropriate

multi-tort cases.
Despite the practicality of this approach, it is hardly surprising, in
light of Erie and its progeny, that two courts of appeals recently have
declined to adopt it.2" Commentators have suggested that two significant
concepts, the idea of federalism and the notion of the separation of powers implicit in the constitutional plan, provide the philosophical underpinnings of the Erie doctrine. 2 Nevertheless, the serious national
problems presented by multi-tort cases indicate that the Erie doctrine
should be reexamined and harmonized with the purposes of federal common law.22
Accordingly, Part I of this Article discusses the Erie line of cases and
establishes that their doctrinal basis does not require that state law invariably be applied in mass toxic tort or multi-tort litigation. Part II analyzes a line of cases demonstrating, with apologies to Mark Twain, that
reports of the death of federal common law have been greatly exaggerated,23 and consequently that federal common law may be created to displace state law in multi-tort cases. Finally, Part III presents an analytic
framework for determining when federal common law should be created
and applied to displace state law in particular multi-tort cases.
I.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ERJE DOCTRINE

TO MULTI-TORT CASES

Enough has been written about Erie24 and its progeny to fill a railroad
car.25 Nonetheless, to determine whether the Erie doctrine should be ap19. See Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and "The" True National

Common Law, 18 Am. U.L. Rev. 316 (1969); Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 Yale
L.J. 284 (1969).
20. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985); In re

"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1128 (1981). See infra notes 255-371 and accompanying text. See also Oman v. Johns-

Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir.) (no admiralty jurisdiction over plaintitf's
personal injury claim alleging exposure to asbestos in shipyard), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.

351 (1985); Van Buskirk v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1985)
(parties in asbestos litigation "conceded" state law applied).
21. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
22. Also implicated are the doctrines of preemption of state law by federal law and of

implied causes of action. This Article does not ignore the import of these doctrines. See
infra notes 51, 227, 333 and accompanying text. Rather it focuses primarily on the Erie
and federal common law lines of cases to highlight what, in essence, are the two issues in
all of these doctrines: the clash between the concepts of federalism and the supremacy of

federal interests, and separation of powers. For an interesting discussion of the interrelationship of these doctrines, see Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52

U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
23. Mark Twain, Saying, in J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 625 (15th ed. 1980)
("The reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.").
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. See. e.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courtv The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L.J. 267 (1974); Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 Harv.
L. Rev. 693 (1974); Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-andof the New FederalCommon Law, 39
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plied in multi-tort cases, we must focus again on the basic policies underlying Erie. This examination reveals that Erie's two principal policiesavoidance of private party forum shopping, and the achievement of fundamental faires 2 6 -- are not furthered by automatically applying state
law in mass tort cases.
A.

The Erie Doctrine

In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 27 the plaintiff was walking along the
defendant's right of way in Pennsylvania when what appeared to be a
door from one of the moving cars struck and injured him.2 8 Tompkins
brought a negligence action in diversity against the railroad in the Southern District of New York.2 9 The defendant railroad argued that section
34 of the Federal Judiciary Act 30 required application of Pennsylvania
law3 1 under which Tompkins would be classified a trespasser, and thus
the railroad
could be liable only if its negligence was "wanton or willful."' 3z The trial judge refused to apply Pennsylvania law and allowed the
case to go to the jury. A judgment of $30,000 was returned in favor of
Tompkins.3 3
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, 34 stating that the question was one of general law, and that "upon
questions of general law the federal courts are free, in the absence of a
local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is
.... "I' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a
federal court was free to disregard a rule of state
common law, or
36
whether section 34 extended to state common law.
Section 34 provided:
the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or
statute of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Friendly I]; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and
the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 427 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hill 1]; Weintraub,
The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 Ind. L.J. 228 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Weintraub I]; Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 311 (1980).
26. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
27. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28. Id. at 69.
29. Id.
30. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
31. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
32. Id. at 70.
33. Id.
34. See Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
35. Id.
36. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
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37
United States in cases where they apply.

In Swift v. Tyson 38 Justice Story had written that section 34 only required application of state statutes and that the statutes be interpreted
and applied in a manner consistent with the approach of the state
courts.3 9 The Court in Erie disagreed and overruled Swift.'
Writing for the majority in Erie, Justice Brandeis began his analysis by
noting that after Swift, the federal courts had "assumed, in the broad
field of 'general law,' the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes."'" In light of
modem commerce clause doctrine, the premise of Justice Brandeis' statement is dubious when applied to the facts of Erie. Under the commerce
clause, Congress may undoubtedly enact a statute regulating an interstate railroad.42
Congress also has passed numerous laws 43 regulating the conduct of

manufacturers and others who are responsible for putting products such
as asbestos and DES and substances such as toxic wastes and Agent Orange into the stream of interstate commerce. 4 Indeed, at least six major
federal agencies, pursuant to dozens of statutes, regulate those and other
substances.4a Clearly then, contrary to Justice Brandeis' view,46 Con37. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
38. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
39. See id at 17-18.
40. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80.
41. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.
42. Congress' power under the commerce clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to enact
legislation regulating the standard of care owed by a railroad involved in interstate commerce is beyond serious dispute. See J. Friedenthal, M.K.Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure 197 (1985); Keeffe, supra note 19, at 320; Friendly I, supra note 25, at 397 n.66.
43. See infra note 45.
44. Congressional power to regulate under the commerce clause, U.S. Coast. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, is very broad. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). In Darby,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 117, 123,
125. The Act regulated wages and hours by prohibiting companies from shipping in
interstate commerce unless the companies adhered to minimum wage and maximum
hour standards. See id at 109. For a general discussion of congressional power under
the commerce clause, see J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 163-67
(1983) and L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 232-44 (1978).
45. The six agencies and their empowering statutes are: (I) the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. 1985), which exercises
regulatory authority over two million workplaces and 75% of the workforce; (2) the
E.P.A., which regulates carcinogens under six statutes: the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. 1985), the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1984 & Supp. 1985), the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982), the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1982 & Supp. 1985), the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. 1985), and the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. 1985), as well as liability and compensation for injuries and damages that result from releases of hazardous substances, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1985); (3) the Consumer Safety Product Commission, established by the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982), to exercise
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gress has the power to declare substantive rules regulating activities affecting interstate commerce. 7 Thus, because the federal courts have
lawmaking power derived from Congress' authority to regulate the products and substances in question,4 8 the federal courts' development of a
federal common law in multi-tort cases would not be an unconstitutional
infringement of state powers.49
Nevertheless, while Justice Brandeis may have incorrectly stated the
constitutional powers involved, the policies underlying his argument remain. It has long been recognized that this prong of Justice Brandeis'
argument rests on the principle of federalism which suggests that it is
improper for federal courts to usurp the lawmaking function that other-

wise remains in the hands of the states.5 0 This view of federalism, how-

authority over thousands of consumer products, 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (1982), including those
covered by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982 &
Supp. 1985); (4) the Food and Drug Administration, exercising authority under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982 & Supp. 1985); (5) the Department of Agriculture, exercising limited authority to control carcinogens in agricultural products and meat under the 1906 Federal Meat Inspection Act and the 1967
Wholesome Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1982 & Supp. 1985); and (6) the Department of Transportation, which regulates the handling and transportation of carcinogenic
substances under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-444 (1982 &
Supp. 1985) and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812
(1982 & Supp. 1985).
Several other agencies have lesser responsibilities for regulating carcinogens: the Federal Trade Commission, under the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982 & Supp. 1985); the Bureau of Mines, under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982 & Supp. 1985), and the
Mine Enforcement Safety Administration, under the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Amendments Act of 1977, 29 U.S.C. § 557a (1982).
46. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
47. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1010 (1985).
48. Professor Hill suggests that when the Supreme Court attributes a preemptive intent to Congress that Congress' "legislative scheme effects a federal occupation of a field,
negating state competence, and devolving upon the federal courts the duty of fashioning
rules of decision even in the absence of any legislative guidance whatever." See Hill, The
Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev.
1024, 1028-29 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hill II]; see also Merrill, supra note 22, at 3640. See infra note 50.
49. For example, in Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,
156 n. 13 (1983), the Court suggested that the Rules of Decision Act does not require that
state law apply whenever a federal statute fails to provide an explicit rule. Del Costello
involved the question of the statute of limitations to be applied in collective bargaining
disputes. Id.at 158. One commentator found that the Court's conclusion "suggests that
all gaps in federal statutes are to be filled by federal common law," whether the Court
adopts a federal rule or borrows a state rule. See Merrill, supra note 22 at 31 n.138.
50. See, e.g., C. Wright, Handbook on the Law of Federal Courts 355 (4th ed. 1983);
Merrill, supra note 22, at 13-16. It has also been suggested that Erie presents a separation
of powers problem because by creating federal general common law the federal courts are
usurping congressional authority. See J. Friedenthal, M.K. Kane & A. Miller, supra note
42, at 197. Article I of the Constitution vests the legislative powers in a congress, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 1, while Article III provides that the judicial power be vested in the
federal courts, U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) ("federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not
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ever, ignores the principle of supremacy of national interests, which is at
least a coequal consideration in analyzing the federal court's lawmaking
power when Congress has acted."1
Justice Brandeis' second concern was that the rule of Swift, rather than
promoting uniformity, invited "mischievous results."52 For example,
before Erie a party could have changed citizenship solely to create diversity jurisdiction and thereby take advantage of a federal rule. 3 Thus,
the judicial, branch of government"); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S.
607, 618 (1944) (the courts' function of interpreting legislation is different from the lawmaking function). Nevertheless it is axiomatic that federal courts have some lawmaking
powers. See Merrill, supra note 22, at 33. See supra note 48. For example, when a
federal court implies a private remedy, it follows the common law tradition that regards
the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the rule. Thus, no separation of
powers problem is presented. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353, 375-76 (1982). This Article argues that no separation of powers problem is
presented when a court generates a federal rule until Congress affirmatively acts by legislating rules that expressly and comprehensively govern an area. Until then, the federal
court must be free to interpret the Constitution and federal laws. Other authors have
made similar arguments. See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 9293 (1982); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1975).
The interstitial lawmaking that results in federal common law rules is proper as long as
courts have some implicit authorization to create such rules derived from federal statutory or constitutional commands. For example, in the City of Milwaukee litigation involving interstate water pollution, the Court held that federal common law governed.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1972). After Congress enacted a new
set of regulations governing the water pollution issue in that case, the basis for applying
federal common law disappeared. Thus, the Court affirmed that its power to create federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of Congress." City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
Any federalism concern arising when federal courts create federal common law may
also be resolved by a positive act of Congress because the will of the states will be expressed by their representatives in Congress. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1018 (1985) (federal authority limited by structure of federal
government, not by constitutional immunity under the tenth amendment); Merrill, supra
note 22, at 16-18, 37 (states are deemed to have acquiesced to the creation of federal
common law because states are represented in Congress). This Article argues that if
congressional power to regulate exists and has been generally exercised, but Congress'has
failed to enact specific legislation, residual power exists in the federal courts to create a
federal rule of decision. See supra note 48, infra note 150.
51. When Congress has evidenced intent to occupy a specific field, any state law governing that area is preempted. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
Therefore, the constitutional scheme requires supremacy of national interests. When
state law prevents reaching congressional goals, state law must yield. Id. See Pacific Gas
& Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1983). Accordingly, even if no specific or express legislative command exists, if the federal court finds that Congress intended some federal policy or that the Constitution suggests some identifiable federal interest, the federal court has the power to displace state
law. See D. Currie, Federal Courts 436-37 (3d ed. 1982); Hill II, supra note 48, at 102630; Merrill, supra note 22, at 36; Monaghan, supra note 50, at 12-15.
52. Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
53. See Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928). Even defenders of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), such as Professor
Keeffe, deplore the case in which a California federal court in a diversity action by a
Senator from Nevada ruled that the Senator was not the common law husband of a par-
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diversity jurisdiction, which was adopted to prevent discrimination
against non-citizens, actually became the source of "grave discrimination
by non-citizens against citizens."'5 4 Because the litigants' rights varied
depending on whether the state or federal forum was chosen, "the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law. In attempting to
promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, the doctrine
had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the State.""
Perhaps this concern of Justice Brandeis is well taken in the typical
tort case where only two or three litigants are involved, the tort takes
place in a determinable location, and the state court invariably applies
the tort law of the state in which the wrong took place.56 In such a case
the rule of decision should not vary from state to state and therefore
arguably should not vary with the plaintiff's choice of a federal or state
forum. No specific federal interest exists in such a case, and the concept
of federalism should accordingly prevail.
This reasoning, however, does not extend to multiparty lawsuits or
multiple lawsuits in which persons throughout the country have been
injured at different times by the same or similar substances. Moreover,
an interest analysis of the choice of law question is increasingly applied in
tort cases57 which may result in applying the law of a state other than the
one where the accident occurred.5 8 It can no longer be said that a party's
rights vest in the state where the injury was incurred, or that a party is
ticular woman contrary to what the California state courts had held. See In re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1, 42-44 (1890); Keeffe, supra note 19, at 317.
54. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75. Of course, the opposite is true as well. Citizens and
noncitizens alike could also become "victims" of the federal rule. See supra notes 63-72
and accompanying text.
55. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
56. At the time Erie was decided, the territorialist approach dominated choice of law
analysis. See E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 17.2 (1982). Thus, in a tort case, the
rule of lex loci delicti-the law of the place of the wrong-applied. The law of the place
of the wrong generally would be the place where the injury was suffered. See id.; see also
Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934) (adopting lex loci delicti in tort cases).
This rule provided certainty and ease of application. No matter where the lawsuit was
brought, the parties could be sure that the law of the place of the wrong would apply. See
R. Crampton, D. Currie & H. Kay, Conflict of Laws 13 (3d ed. 1981) (quoting Goodrich,
Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. Va. L. Rev. 156, 165, 167 (1930)).
57. Indeed, since 1963, most states have rejected the strict territorial approach to
choice of law and adopted more flexible choice of law approaches. R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws § 6.17, at 308 (2d ed. 1980) (most jurisdictions addressing conflicts questions in tort law have supplanted situs rules with interest analysis);
Scoles & Hay, supra note 56, at 560; see Weintraub, The Future of Choice of Law for
Torts: What Principles Should be Preferred?, 41 Law & Contemp. Probs. 146 (Spring
1977) [hereinafter cited as Weintraub II]; see, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751-52 (1963). For a discussion of moder
approaches to choice of law in tort cases, see Scoles & Hay, supra note 56, at § 17.11
(interest analysis); id. § 17.18 (the better law approach); id. § 17.21 (the most significant
relationship test).
58. For example, in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 201, 480
N.E.2d 679, 687, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 98 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals held that
New York law would not apply to the issue of charitable immunity in a case involving
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somehow entitled to the law of a particular state. More importantly, the
choice of forum in mass tort cases is not simply a choice between the
"federal court ... [or] . . .a state court a block away." 9 Rather, as
notions of personal jurisdiction expand, it is often a state-to-state choice
with the plaintiff seeking to choose the most favorable procedural or substantive law or choice of law rules from among the several different states
that can exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants.' The multiplicity of modem choice of law analyses, together with the expansion of personal jurisdiction, thus provides a greater scope for disuniformity.
Because plaintiffs can often choose a federal court by structuring the
case to ensure complete diversity, 6 1 Erie permits litigants to engage in
state-to-state forum shopping. When applied to multi-tort litigation, the
Erie doctrine's advantage of promoting uniformity in the administration
of the law of a particular state may be illusory because it may at the same
time contribute to state-to-state forum shopping, which leads to a lack of
uniformity. Indeed, federal court litigants may thwart whatever interests
State A may have had in applying its law by suing in a federal court in
State B that would choose to apply either its own law, or the law of yet
another state.6 2 Thus, a plaintiff can thwart the equal administration of
nonresident plaintiffs and defendants even though the tortious acts occurred in New
York.
59. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
60. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2979 (1985) ("[i]n most
cases the plaintiff shows his obvious wish for forum law by filing there"). The number of
possible forums in which a defendant will be amenable to suit has expanded since the
Supreme Court announced the "minimum contacts" test in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This approach has led to development of longarm statutes greatly expanding the reach of state court jurisdiction. See Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2177 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 777 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957); Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 466 (Master ed. 1980).
The expansion of personal jurisdiction theory permits more state-to-state forum shopping than was previously possible. For example, whether a plaintiff still has a valid claim
depends on the statute of limitations and tolling rules of the states in which the lawsuit is
brought. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). If the statute of limitations has expired in New York, a plaintiff might sue in some other state where the statute
is still running. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), plaintiff, a
nonresident, sued Hustler, a magazine publisher, for libel in New Hampshire because it
was the only state whose statute of limitations had not yet expired. See id at 773. New
Hampshire also had a "single publication" rule, which allowed all damages suffered in all
jurisdictions to be recovered in a single action in that state. See id; Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 577A(4) (1976). Although the rule generally benefits defendants because it
prevents piecemeal litigation, in Keeton it could allow the plaintiff to recover damages
suffered in the 49 states where her action would have been time-barred. See Capra, ConceptualLimitations on Long-Arm Jurisdiction,52 Fordham L. Rev. 1034, 1044-51 (1984).
61. In Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806), Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction, currently codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), to require complete diversity. Thus, plaintiffs can meet the complete diversity requirement by suing only defendants whose citizenship is different from
each of the plaintiffs.
62. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text The same result would obtain if
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the law of a State A by choosing a federal court in a State B whose choice
of law rules mandate applying another substantive law more favorable to
the plaintiff.6 3 It is not the choice of a federal forum, but rather the
the plaintiff chose a state court in another state. The point is that Erie permits the litigants to use the federal courts to achieve the same "unfair" result. The Erie doctrine
could prevent the application of one interested state's law because the plaintiff can sue in
a federal court in another state that would apply a different rule. If the point of Erie is to
avoid subjecting a defendant to different rules governing his primary conduct, see P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal Systems
714-15 (2d ed. 1973); H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal
System 634-35 (1953), Erie lacks relevance in a multi-tort case. A defendant's conduct
could be subject to up to 50 different states' differing standards of liability. In addition,
application of Erie in multi-tort cases contributes to state-to-state forum shopping, which
arguably burdens interstate commerce because a defendant's conduct is subject to the
vagaries of so many different rules. State regulation that operates to discriminate against
interstate commerce by disrupting uniform standards of conduct implicit in federal policy
violates the commerce clause. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960) (finding no constitutional violation because state regulation did
not burden interstate commerce). Indeed, even in the absence of federal legislation, the
commerce clause restricts the reach of state laws. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299, 313 (1851). Accordingly, the commerce clause prohibits federal
courts from being used in a way that would create a burden on interstate commerce.
63. Perhaps Justice Brandeis divined another kind of unfairness-the unfairness that
would result if some litigants were denied a federal forum, and accordingly, the opportunity to use a federal rule. For example, in suits lacking complete diversity, see Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806), or in which there is diversity but
removal is unavailable because one of the defendants is a citizen of the forum state, see 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982), the plaintiff's choice of a state court will deny the parties the
opportunity to argue that a federal rule should apply. In these cases, unfairness would
arise because the lack of a federal forum precludes the parties from arguing for a federal
rule.
Let us, however, determine whether there will be unfairness to plaintiffs or defendants
in the usual case. Plaintiffs can insure a federal forum, and accordingly, the opportunity
to take advantage of federal law, either by naming only diverse defendants, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1982), or if all defendants are co-citizens by having a diverse named plaintiff
bring a class action. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (in class actions,
court looks only to the citizenship of the named representatives of the class). While in
the past it was difficult to convince a federal court to certify a mass tort class, see In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States
Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976), such
classes have been certified in the context of toxic torts, see In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 723-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Maritima, S.A., 70 F.R.D. 401, 404-406 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Defendants, in many cases, will frequently be able to remove cases to a federal court,
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (c) (1982). There will be occasions, however, when removal will be
unavailable because a defendant is a citizen of the forum state, thus preventing litigants
from arguing for application of a federal rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) (removal
proper only if none of the defendants is a citizen of the forum state). See infra note 65.
This does not necessarily result in greater unfairness than when state law is applied. Suppose, for example, New York law is especially favorable to plaintiffs. The law of plaintiff's domicile, Ohio, is particularly unfavorable. The rational plaintiff will sue in New
York, the defendant's domicile. The state court defendant would be no more prejudiced
by application of a federal rule than by application of the New York rule. Other litigants
should not be denied the opportunity to argue for a federal rule simply because removal is
sometimes impossible.
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choice of a court in State B that creates the equal administration problem. In the typical tort case, that may be the price of federalism. In
multi-tort cases, however, the clash of state interests and the presence of
important federal interests suggests a different result.
In analyzing Erie, the posture of the parties is critical. The case involved a suit in a New York federal court' brought by a nonresident
against a New York corporation. Thus, the plaintiff was in a position to
seek a more favorable rule of law in a federal court. Had the plaintiff
sued in state court, the action would have been unremovable,6 5 state law
undoubtedly would have applied and the New York defendant would
have been protected by New York choice of law principles." Erie, and
its later extension to equity suits,6 7 prevented the nonresident plaintiff
from seeking to foist an unfavorable federal rule of law on the resident
defendant who otherwise would be protected by forum state law.6 8
If, however, the parties' residencies are reversed, quite different considerations would come into play. If a resident plaintiff sues a nonresident
defendant in state court, the action is removable. Thus, before Erie, the
nonresident defendant could avoid unfavorable forum state law by removing to a federal court, which would apply federal general common
law. In no sense, then, could there be "discrimination" by virtue of applying a federal rule. Ironically, applying Erie in this situation perpetuates discrimination against nonresident defendants, because they will be
unable to argue for applying a federal rule rather than unfavorable forum
law. That result seems contrary to the spirit of Erie
In addition, Erie does not prevent a plaintiff from finding another state
in which the defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction and in
which an unfavorable state rule would be applied. This forum shopping
also deprives defendants of the favorable law that would have been applied by the state in which they reside. Erie could not prevent that, despite the apparent unfairness. Furthermore, plaintiffs now can sue most
corporate defendants in a state or federal forum in plaintiffs' home states,
64. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) provides:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought.
Ia Thus, the defendants in Erie and Guaranty Trust would not have been entitled to
remove their actions.
66. In Erie, the defendant would be protected by New York law because under the
vested rights choice of law approach used at the time, see supra note 56, the New York
courts would have chosen to apply Pennsylvania law, the law of the place where the tort
occurred. Similarly in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the New York
defendant would have been protected by application of the forum (New York) statute of
limitations.
67. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
68. See supra note 66.
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assuming there is personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant and

that the parties are diverse.69 If the state forum is chosen, the corporate
defendant is generally free to remove the case because it is not a citizen of
the state. 70 Accordingly, there can be no choice of law prejudice to the
defendant because it can freely choose to stay in state court or remove to
federal court.
Similarly, no unfairness is inflicted on the plaintiff because the plaintiff's counsel should be aware that the case is removable. If the plaintiff
believes state law favors its position and chooses defendants either to destroy diversity jurisdiction or to prevent removal, the defendant will be

unable to seek application of federal common law. However, this is a
necessary consequence of the federal courts' limited subject matter jurisdiction and does not result in the denial of a litigant's equal protection
interests that concerned Justice Brandeis in Erie.71 Thus, although some
federal-state forum shopping might occur if federal common law is applied in mass tort cases, this is better than state-to-state forum shopping
because, as Part III demonstrates, the federal interests in these cases are
substantial, the harm
occurs in many states, and predictability of result
72
would be greater.
Erie does not support the proposition that federal common law may
not be applied in multi-tort cases, in which federal regulatory powers

may be in issue. Moreover, even if Erie required that state law be applied
in multi-tort cases, Justice Brandeis' goal of equal administration of the
laws would be thwarted. If Justice Brandeis' equal protection concern is

valid, 73 the Constitution must also require uniform rules in multi-tort
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982) provides:
For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of
the State where it has its principal place of business: Providedfurther, That in
any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is
not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the
State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the
insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business.
Id. (emphasis in original).
In addition, if the plaintiffs were injured in the state of their citizenship, the forum
would probably have personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant under the forum
state's long arm statute. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-59b (West Supp. 1984-1985);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1984-1985). Federal courts apply
the personal jurisdiction law of the forum state in diversity cases. See Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963).

70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
71. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938). See supra notes 52-55 and
accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
73. The fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1,
applies to the federal government. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Nevertheless, there has been much debate over whether the constitutional basis of the Erie
decision is supportable. Among the commentators who criticize the constitutional dis-
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cases because applying one state's law would discriminate against the law
of another state and against some parties in an action, 4 and unreasonacussion are: W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States 563-74, 711-937 (1953); Ahems, Erie v.Tompkins-The Not So Common Law, 1
Washburn L.J. 343, 378-79 (1962); Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision-More on the
Erie Case, 30 Ky. L.J. 3, 5 (1941); Clark, supra note 25, at 273, 278; Cowan, Constitutional Aspects of the Abolition of Federal "Common Law," 1 La. L. Rev. 161, 167-73
(1938); Herriott, Has Congress the Power to Modify the Effect of Erie Railroad Co. .
Tompkins?, 26 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1941); Keeffe, supra note 19, at 316-17; Keeffe,
Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 Cornell L.Q. 494, 496-97 (1949); Kurland, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter,the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrinein Diversity Cases, 67 Yale
L.J. 187, 188-204 (1957); McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the
L. Rev. 126, 133-35 (1938). Those arguing that the constitutional
FederalCourts, 33 Ill.
discussion was correct or necessary include: Bowman, The Unconstitutionality of the
Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U.L. Rev. 659, 673-80 (1938); Ely, supra note 25, at 700-06;
Friendly I, supra note 25, at 384-98; Hart, The RelationsBetween State and FederalLaw,
54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 509-10 (1954); Hill I, supra note 25, at 438-48; Leathers, Erie and
Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. Rev. 791, 795-96 (1974); Mishkin, Some
FurtherLast Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1682, 1682-88 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin I]; Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 Tul. L. Rev. 443, 465-70 (1962); Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdictionand the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 216, 238-40
(Winter 1948); Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested
Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 Tex. L.Rev. 549, 549-53 (1959).
74. Hill I, supra note 25, at 454-55. Professor Hill has argued that the drafters of the
Constitution did not intend the result in federal inferior courts to mirror the result that
would be obtained in state courts. See iL at 454. He suggests that the privileges and
immunities clause of the Constitution would not be violated where state choice of law
decisions are resolved in favor of application of forum or some other law regardless of the
citizenship of the parties in the litigation. See id at 454-55. Take the previous example
from note 66, supra, on whether the New York rule would apply. At the time Erie was
decided, the lex loci delicti rule-the law of the place of the wrong-was uniformly applied in tort cases. See supra note 56. Therefore, all parties would know which state's
law would apply. State-to-state forum shopping was impossible because the law of the
state of the wrong would apply regardless of where the action was brought. Since the
landmark case of Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), was decided, however, most states have used some form of interest analysis requiring the court to balance competing governmental policies when determining which
state's law applies. See Scoles & Hay, supra note 56, at 565-70. The choice of law question will often depend on the citizenship of the parties. Id This frequently leads to
application of forum state law. See B. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, in Selected Essays on Conflicts of Laws 183 (1963); Milhollin, The
Forum Preference in Choice of Law; Some Notes on Hurtado v. Superior Court, 10
U.S.F.L. Rev. 625, 627-31 (1976); Sedler, Rules of Choice Law Versus Choice-of-Law
Rules: JudicialMethod in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 975, 1032-41 (1977).
In any event, use of modern choice of law methods leads to unpredictability. See Scoles
& Hay, supra note 56, at 42-46. Because Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941), requires a federal court to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state, id.
at 496, obtaining "equal administration" of the laws accordingly becomes much less
probable and encourages state-to-state forum shopping. See Mishkin, The Variousness of
"FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of Nationaland State Rules for
Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 806-07 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin II]. In
multi-tort cases, the courts are continuously confronted with novel twists on old
problems such as causation and the accrual date of a cause of action. Thus, given the
complexity of determining what the law of the state is, it defies logic to say that Erie
precludes applying a federal rule because it would result in unequal administration of
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bly burden interstate commerce.7 5
Even if the Erie rationale does not rise to a constitutional level, but
rather is predicated on section 34,76 the result is the same. Section 34
requires state law to be applied "except where the Constitution or treaties
77
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide."
When read with procedural statutes that permit consolidating related
cases that were commenced in many districts, 78 th q statutes Congress
passed that regulate the products and substances that give rise to toxic
tort litigation 79 provide the basis for applying federal law.8 0 Indeed, a
close reading of the later refinements of Erie in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York,"' Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative2 and Hanna v.
Plumer,83 demonstrates that strict application of Erie is not warranted in
multi-tort cases.
B.

The Myth of the Substantive/ProceduralDichotomy: A Two Part
Test for Determining the Meaning of "Substantive"
for Erie Purposes

In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York," a the Court confirmed that equal administration of the laws was the Erie doctrine's primary purpose. The
issues in Guaranty Trust were whether Erie and its interpretation of section 34 required applying state law in equity cases,8 5 and if so, whether a
state statute of limitations-traditionally characterized as a procedural
rule-must be applied.8 6 The Court answered both questions affirmatively, and in doing so adopted the "outcome determinative" test.8 7 But
state laws when important federal regulatory policies may be at stake. Cf. id. (nationwide
choice of law rule must be adopted to prevent state-to-state forum shopping).
75. See supra note 62.
76. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)). Justice Reed confined the Erie rationale to section 34. See Eric
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 90-91 (Reed, J., concurring).
77. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
78. See infra notes 308, 320-22, 338-49 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 45.
80. See text accompanying infra notes 235-37.
81. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
82. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
83. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
84. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
85. See id. at 101.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 109. In Guaranty Trust, the Court ruled that when a lawsuit is in
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the federal court adjudication should
not lead to a substantially different result than if the lawsuit had been commenced in a
state court. Id. Thus, if the application of the legal rule in issue would determine the
outcome of the litigation, the state rule must be applied. Id. at 108-09. In Guaranty
Trust, because the question of statute of limitations would significantly affect the outcome
of the case, the state rule must be applied. Id. at 110. The test has been criticized because applied literally, almost any rule, including procedural rules, can be outcome deter-
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the Court made several other observations far more important for purposes of this Article.
First, Justice Frankfurter noted that Erie concerns only arise in the
case of "transactions for which rights and obligations are created by one
of the States."'8 8 Second, he recognized that the substance/procedure
distinction 9 does not determine what law should apply. 0 Rather, Erie
was meant to prevent the "accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in
a federal court instead of in a State court a block away""' from leading to
a "substantially different result." 92 Finally, he stated that federal courts
may provide equitable remedies for substantive rights recognized by
states despite a state's inability to provide that same remedy.93
In multi-tort cases, there is no "accident of a suit" "by a non-resident
litigant" in a federal court rather than a state court.94 Instead, the choice
of a federal forum stems from the plaintiff's view of which forum state's
law will provide the best result.95 Moreover, because of the existence of
relevant federal statutes and because of the multiple parties and many
states involved, it cannot be argued that multi-tort cases involve only
"rights and obligations... created by one of the States." 96 Rather, because plaintiffs have suffered injury in many different states, and potential defendants' conduct caused harm in different states, various states
may have an interest in a multi-tort case. Thus, the parties' rights and
obligations may not readily be said to have been created by any one of
these states. Therefore, it is unclear whether the issues in these cases are
clearly "substantive" or "procedural" for Erie purposes. 97 Significantly,
the Court distinguished "the right" to sue from "the remedy" to be
granted. This confirms that not all issues are necessarily governed by the
same law.
Although Byrd 98 is perhaps the least understood and most confusing
of Erie's progeny, it seems to illuminate the meaning of "substantive" for
Erie purposes by explaining why the Guaranty Trust Court noted that
the substance/procedure dichotomy cannot always provide the answer to
the question of what law should apply.99 In Byrd, a resident of South
Carolina sued in federal court for injuries suffered while connecting
minative. See, e.g., C. Wright, supra note 50, at 357. This standard has been abandoned
by the Court. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965).
88. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 101.
89. Id at 108-09.

90. See id. at 109.
91. Id.
92. Id
93. See id at 106.
94. See infra notes 308, 320-22, 338-49 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 60, 63 and accompanying text.
96. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 101.
97. Id at 109.
98. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
99. See Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the AppropriateDilemma, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 362-66, 383-88 (1977).
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power lines for the defendant electric power company.co The court of
appeals reversed a judgment against the defendant because, in the court's
view, the plaintiff was a statutory employee whose only remedy was
under South Carolina's Worker Compensation Act. 01' The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the trial court to provide the plaintiff with an
opportunity to present evidence on the statutory employee issue.' 0 2 In
addition, the Court held that on remand, pursuant to federal policy, the
facts pertaining to the statutory employee issue were to be decided by 03
a
jury, rather than by the judge, as was required by South Carolina law. 1
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan conceded that had the jury
issue been "bound up [with] the rights and obligations of the parties'
under South Carolina law, state law would have governed the issue.1°5
The Court failed to establish a concrete test for determining when an
10 6
issue was "bound up [with] the rights and obligations of the parties."'
Justice Brennan's opinion, however, noted that when the issue presented
was not within that class, the federal courts must evaluate "countervailing considerations" 0 7 that may favor applying a federal rule over the
otherwise applicable state rules 0 8 because the federal courts are an "independent system for 10administering
justice to litigants who properly in9
voke its jurisdiction."
The Byrd Court, like the Guaranty Trust Court, was concerned with
only one state's rule." 0 In Byrd, the Court concluded that the rule in
issue, unlike the statute of limitations issue present in Guaranty Trust, " 'I
served no significant policy of any particular state.1 2 Accordingly, the
rule was not "intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights
and obligations of the parties."' 13 Therefore, under the Byrd approach,
100. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 526-27.
101. See Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. v. Byrd, 238 F.2d 346, 350 (4th Cir. 1956),
rev'd, 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
102. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 532-33.
103. See id. at 532-34.
104. Id. at 536.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 535-36.
107. Id. at 537.
108. See id. Two commentators suggest that the Byrd test does not survive Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See Redish & Phillips, supra note 99, at 364 n.48, 368. But
see Ely, supra note 25, at 696-97. A number of courts, however, still use the Byrd analysis. See, e.g., Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d 1320,
1325-26 (2d Cir. 1977); American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print
Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1180-82 (3d Cir. 1972); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349
F.2d 60, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1965).
109. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
110. The only state law considered by the Court in Byrd was that of South Carolina.
See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 527. The Guaranty Trust Court was concerned only with New
York law. See Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 101.
111. 326 U.S. at 101.
112. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
113. Id.
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the first question in multi-tort cases is whether a particular state rule to
be applied by a court to a particular issue invokes a particular state's
policy interests. When a court finds that a rule does not serve a significant policy of a particular state or that the significant policies of a
number of states are implicated, Byrd suggests that the rule is not "intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of
the parties. 11 14 With plaintiffs and defendants from several states present in multi-tort cases, the potentially applicable rules may serve conflicting state policies. Although each state's policy interests may be
important, the parties' rights and obligations in multi-tort cases cannot
be said to derive, in a vested rights sense, from a particular state's rule.
The fact that there are competing state interests, even significant interests, which must be resolved is in itself a countervailing consideration
calling for federal courts to consider applying a federal rule. Byrd suggests that in its choice of law analysis a federal court should examine
countervailing federal considerations as embodied in the federal regulatory statutes.
In multi-tort cases, the federal courts should be permitted to weigh the
federal interests implicated to ensure that applying one state's rule will
not disrupt the federal system or thwart the policies of another state. " 5
This approach is consistent with Byrd because there the federal policy
supported by the "influence-if not the command-of the Seventh
Amendment"" 6 outweighed the "policy of uniform enforcement of statecreated rights and obligations.""' 7 Byrd thus provides the first step in
determining whether the federal courts should create and apply federal
common law to all or some of these issues. The next question is whether
the purposes of the Erie doctrine would be undermined if a federal court
applies a federal rule different from one the forum state would have ap118
plied. This analysis was undertaken by the Court in Hanna v. Plumer.
The narrow question presented in Hanna was whether service of process in a federal diversity action is governed by Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or by the applicable state rule. "9 In holding
that the federal rule applied, 2 0 the Court refused to enmesh itself in
either the substantive/procedural dichotomy or the amorphous outcome
determinative test.12 ' Instead, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
Court, stated that the "twin aims" of Erie-discouraging forum shop114. Id.
115. Id. at 537. See infra notes 304.09 and accompanying text.
116. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537 (citation omitted).
117. Id at 537-38 (footnote omitted).
118. 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see Comment, Hanna v. Plumer: An Expanded Concept of
Federal Common Lan-A Requiem ForErie?, 1966 Duke L.J. 142, 160 (broad command
to apply federal rules regardless of the resulting conflict between federal and state adjudication of state-created rights).
119. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
120. See ideat 463-64.
121. See il at 465-67.
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ping and avoiding inequitable administration of the laws' 2 2 must be the
123
reference point in determining whether state law should be applied.
This interpretation of Erie shows that in multi-tort cases, application of a
federal rule would discourage state-to-state forum shopping and also
24
would avoid the equal protection concern raised by Justice Brandeis. 1
As the commentators have noted and Hanna itself makes clear, Hanna
does not support the general proposition that a state's substantive law
may be displaced by federal common law. 2 ' Rather, the presumption is
that when a state-created right is presented to a federal court for adjudication, state law applies to every substantive issue in the case. 126 This
assures that state interests are protected in the federal system. As
demonstrated in the discussion of Byrd, however, it can be argued that in
multi-tort cases, it makes no sense to talk about "substance" and "procedure" because the state interests compete or are inchoate. Indeed, in
Hanna the Court observed that there will be issues difficult to characterize as substantive or procedural. 127 The Court stated:
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented
by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those
courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain area between substance
and proce8
dure, are rationally capable of classification as either. 12
Moreover, Hanna suggests that Erie permits Congress and federal courts
to consider whether to fashion federal rules of decision for federal courts
when the rules are "supported by a grant of federal authority
contained
29
in Article I or some other section of the Constitution.'
Various procedural devices are available and should be used in multitort cases. The availability of these prpcedural rules invokes the command from Hanna that the power to make such rules also includes the
power to regulate the range of issues that defy characterization as procedural or substantive and that obviously were not directly controlled by
an act of Congress. 3 ' The availability of a procedural rule permits
122. Id. at 468.
123. See id.
124. See supra notes 27-80 and accompanying text.
125. See Hanna at 471-72; Redish & Phillips, supra note 99, at 382-83.
126. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D.
Shapiro & H. Wechsler, supra note 62, at 734-39; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82
Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1517-19 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Federal Common Law]; see, e.g.,
Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n. I (2d Cir.
1956) ("it is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on which federal
jurisdiction over the case is founded, which determines the governing law") (emphasis in
original).
127. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 471.
130. See id. at 472. See supra notes 96-97, 112-17, infra notes 247-50, and accompanying text.
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courts in multi-tort cases to engage in the two part test proposed in this
section. It allows a federal court to first determine whether the various
state interests presented cancel each other out such that the federal court
is free to consider federal interests. Second, it requires the court to determine whether applying a federal rule would undermine the "twin aims"
of Erie.
The next Part turns to the question of whether multi-tort cases, like

other cases in which federal common law has been applied, implicate
important federal concerns that justify creating federal rules to vindicate

the discernible federal interests in the absence of explicit governing federal legislation.
II.

A.

THE NEW FEDERAL COMMON LAW

The Meaning of Federal Common Law

On the same day Justice Brandeis announced in Erie that "[t]here is no
federal general common law," 13 he also declared in Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. 32 that federal common law ap-

plied to the apportionment of waters of an interstate stream.' 33 What

Justice Brandeis ignored and many commentators have similarly failed to
consider is that Erie and its progeny and the federal common law line of
cases are two sides of the same coin."3 4 On the Erie side, federalism
dominates; on the other, the supremacy of federal interest dominates.
Knowing that federal common law exists does not define the concept.
What, then, is federal common law? Federal common law is simply a
label pinned on a rule of law created by a federal court when it finds that
an issue cannot be resolved directly by
reference to the Constitution, a
35

treaty, a federal statute, or state law.'

131. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
132. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
133. See id.at 110. The Court also acknowledged that controversies concerning state
boundary disputes were governed by federal common law. See id.
134. But see Merrill, supra note 22, at 12-13.
135. Some commentators refer to the rules as "National Common Law." See
Cheatham, Comments by Elliott Cheatham on the True NationalCommon Law, 18 Am.
U.L. Rev. 372, 374 (1969); Keeffe, supra note 19, at 316. Professor Cheatham abhors use
of the term federal common law, which might refer to rules that are binding on the states
under the supremacy clause, see infra note 209, or which might also refer to the federal
court's independent determination of what state law is. See id. at 327-29; Swift v. Tyson
Exhumed, supra note 19, at 294-97. Other commentators view the meaning of federal
common law broadly. For instance, Professor Merrill defines federal common law as
"any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text." Merrill, supra note 22, at 5 (emphasis in original). Thus, federal common law
would include constitutional lawmaking or "non-originalist" judicial review, cases involving implied rights of action, and ordinary statutory construction. Id. at 7. He also
argues that federal common law, as a law of the United States, is binding on the states.
Id at 7. This Article focuses on the kind of federal common law that Professor Merrill
might justify as "preemptive lawmaking." I& at 3, 48-53. However, the Article argues
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Factors relevant in the development of these rules include the subject
matter jurisdiction basis for the lawsuit, 136 the presence and strength of
state interests, 37 the interstate nature of the controversy, 38 the presence
of a federal party, 139 the strength of the federal interest, 4 ° the existence
of relevant federal constitutional, treaty, or statutory law,' 4 ' and finally,
expediency. 142 The interaction of these factors in multi-tort cases makes
applying federal common law appropriate and permissible because a
court's power to create a federal rule of decision derives from either a
federal policy or text.
B.

The Birth of the New Federal Common Law

In the years immediately following Erie and Hinderlider,federal common law was applied in a variety of cases. 143 The gestation period of the
federal common law terminated in 1943 when the Court decided
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.144 In that case, the Court predicated creation of the new federal common law on the principle that when
sufficient federal interests exist, a federal court is free to fashion a federal
rule of decision to apply to particular issues in a case.145
that federal common law rules created in multi-tort cases need not be given binding effect. See infra note 209.
136. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105-06 (1972); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957).
137. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981); United States
v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
138. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
110-11 (1938).
139. See, e.g., Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959); United States v. Standard

Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947).
140. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1964).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93
(1973); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1972).
142. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the expedience factor. See City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) ("[f]ederal common law is a 'necessary
expedient' "). In addition, Judge Friendly has alluded to expedience as a factor. See
Friendly I, supra note 25, at 387 n.23. Judge Friendly stated that when the Court perceives a need, it will permit the creation of a federal common law to protect the federal
interest when Congress has failed to provide an express rule. See id. at 413. See infra
notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945) (federal common law applied to question of whether interest was recoverable on claim under Fair
Labor Standards Act); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1942)
(federal common law applied in an action by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on
note transferred by a state bank as collateral); Royal Indemnification Co. v. United
States, 313 U.S. 289, 296 (1941) (federal common law applied to question of interest on
surety bond to stay enforcement of federal tax assessment); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S.
190, 200-01 (1940) (federal common law applied to determine whether a director or a
national bank was estopped from defending on the basis of illegality when a receiver sued
him on a note); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939)
(federal common law applied in suit by United States to recover taxes illegally collected
by a state from an Indian ward).

144. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
145. See id. at 366-67.
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Three cases since Clearfield Trust-Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,4 7 and Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee' 4 8 -represent the doctrine's maturation. In these cases the
Court revealed that two factors are central to whether federal common
law can be created: whether some peculiar or unique federal interest is
involved'4 9 and whether Congress implicitly intended that the court's interstitial or common law lawmaking function be exercised.' 5 0
1. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States-The Role
of Federal Interests
In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States151 the federal government sued
a bank to recover for the payment of a forged United States Treasury
check that the bank had innocently cashed." 2 The issue was whether
state law or federal common law should apply to the bank's argument
that the government's delay in providing it with notice of the forgery
prevented the government's recovery. 53 The Court began by observing
that Erie did not apply because federal law applies to issues of the federal
government's rights and obligations on commercial paper it issues.'
In its analysis, the Court noted that the issuance of commercial paper
by the United States was vast and that transactions involving that paper
frequently occurred in several states."' 5 In addition, the Court feared
that applying state law would subject the United States' rights and duties
to exceptional uncertainty and would subject identical transactions to the
vagaries of the laws of each state. 5 6 Accordingly, the Court stated that a
uniform rule would be desirable and observed that the federal law
merchant that had developed under the regime of Swift v. Tyson could
serve "as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules
applicable to these federal questions."' 5 7 A uniform federal rule was
needed to protect those rights of the United States that found their
146. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
147. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
148. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
149. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
150. See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957). Professor Hill, for example, argues
that "federal courts have, in general, the same creative function and the same range of
remedial authority as do state courts in their different spheres of competence." Hill II,
supra note 48, at 1025. The thesis of this Article is that the federal courts have competence to create common law rules in the area of multi-tort litigation based on the implicit
command of various federal procedural and regulatory statutes. See supra notes 48-50
and accompanying text.
151. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
152. See id. at 364-66.
153. See id. at 366.
154. See id.
155. I& at 367.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 367.
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"roots" in federal constitutional and statutory sources. As a result, the
federal courts 8 had implicit authority to create legal rules to vindicate
those rights.15
2.

Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills-The Role
of Congressional Intent

In two ways, the Court in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,I

9

further

developed the idea articulated in Clearfield Trust'" that federal common
law may be applied when federal rights stem from federal sources of law.

First, Clearfield Trust's approach was extended to a case involving only
private parties.16 1 Second, the role of congressional intent emerged as an

explicit factor in determining whether a federal rule of law should be
created and applied. 6 2

As in Clearfield Trust, state law created the plaintiff's cause of ac-

tion. 163 A collective bargaining agreement between a union and an employer provided that there would be no strike or work stoppages, and
that the last step in a grievance procedure was to be arbitration. I I After
the employer refused to arbitrate, the union sued in federal district court
to compel arbitration. 65 The issue before the Court concerned the con-

stitutionality of section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947166 which provided that federal district courts had subject matter
jurisdiction over suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements

without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 167 The employer argued
that the action before the Court was simply a state cause of action for
158. Id. at 366. The Court listed a number of federal sources for the right at issue
including the Constitution, because issuing a check is an exercise of a constitutional function of power, see id., various Treasury Regulations, see id. at 366 n.2, and a federal
criminal statute that bore on the issue of a forged endorsement, see id. The need for
uniformity in Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), was no more plain than it is in a mass
tort case. Moreover, Justice Douglas did not articulate in Clearfield Trust a cogent reason why the uncertainty created by applying different state rules to federal government
obligations is any more compelling than in a private case. Thus, it is at least arguable
that the need for uniformity stemmed more from a desire to protect a federal right than
from the fact of uncertainty. See id. at 367.
159. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
160. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
161. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-51. See infra note 271.
162. See id. at 457.
163. Id. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 449.
165. See id.
166. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
167. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449-50. The statute states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
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breach of contract because the Act did not explicitly set forth the rights
and duties of parties under collective bargaining agreements. 68 Thus,
because there was no Article 111169 basis such as a federal question inherent in section 301(a), the federal courts lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 1 '
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Douglas, solved the problem
by reading section 301(a) to include not only the jurisdictional grant,'"
but also an authorization to "the federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements."' 7 2 The parties' rights and obligations would then be governed
by this emerging body of judge-made law. Accordingly, the jurisdictional grant of section 301(a) was constitutional because the case arose
under federal law.' 7 3
Conceding that the legislative history on whether Congress intended to
authorize the creation of federal judge-made law was "somewhat cloudy
and confusing,"' 7 4 Justice Douglas looked to "a few shafts of light that
illuminate[d the] problem."' 5 Under this judicial lamp, he found that
section 301(a) "expresse[d] a federal policy that federal courts should
enforce these agreements"' 7 6 and that "the substantive law to apply [was
a] federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."' 7 7 Although the obvious place to look for substantive
law in this case would be the Labor Management Relations Act, which
expressly provided some substantive law, Justice Douglas recognized
that other cases could prove more difficult:
Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates.
Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking
at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem.... It is not uncommon for federal
78
courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned.
Thus, the Lincoln Mills Court recognized that even in disputes be168. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 468-69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
169. Article III provides that the federal court's judicial power extends to cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties." U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2.
170. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
171. See id at 451.
172. Id at 451.
173. See id at 457. Because Congress used the power to regulate labor-management
relations under the commerce clause of the Constitution, U.S. Coast. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the
case was within the purview of judicial power as defined in Article III. See Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. at 457.
174. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 452.
175. Id
176. Id at 455.

177. Id at 456.

178. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) and National Metro. Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454
(1945)).
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tween private parties, a federal court has the authority and power to create federal rules based on federal rights derived from even an ambiguous
"penumbra of express statutory mandates."' 7 9 According to Justice
Douglas, the federal rights and policies involved were so strong and the
legislative intent sufficiently clear, that both the rule of decision and subject matter jurisdiction were provided. 80 Even when federal rights and
policies are less directly implicated, if an alternative basis for asserting
subject matter jurisdiction already
exists,' 8 I federal judge-made law may
82
be applied in private disputes.
For example, Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co. "I involved a
private dispute regarding the validity of a patent. 184 The patentee sued a
licensee for unpaid royalties in federal court based on diversity. 8 5 The
question was whether the invalidity of the patent estopped the patent
licensee from challenging a price-fixing clause in the licensing agreement.186 The court of appeals had dismissed the licensee's counterclaim
because the licensee accepted a license under the patent, and was thereby
estopped from denying its validity.' 8 7 The court cited neither state law
nor federal law to support that conclusion.' 8 The Supreme Court
stated, however, that the Erie doctrine did not control because the doctrine of estoppel invoked by the court of appeals conflicted with the Sherman Act's 89 prohibitions against price-fixing.' 90 The Court noted:
It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may not
be set at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state common law rules .... [In Erie] we followed state law because it was the
law to be applied in the federal courts. But the doctrine of that case is
inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy
of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal
relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal
law
19 1
having its source in those statutes, rather than by local law.
Although Sola involved only a private dispute, the federal policies underlying the Sherman Act were so overwhelming that the Court did not
discuss any state interests. 192 Moreover, arguably the Court thought no
179. Id.
180. See id. at 455-56.
181. For example, a case may be properly before the Court under diversity jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
182. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
183. 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
184. See id. at 173.
185. See id. at 173-74.
186. See id.at 173.
187. See Jefferson Elec. Co. v. Sola Elec. Co., 125 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 317
U.S. 173 (1942).
188. See id.
189. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
190. See Sola, 317 U.S. at 176-77 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
191. Id.at 176.
192. See id. at 177.
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other factors were necessary to support the creation of a federal rule on
the estoppel issue because a federal statute was the basis for a defense and
therefore was directly in issue in Sola. When federal statutes are not so
directly in issue, however, other reasons have been cited to justify creating a federal rule. 193
Thus Lincoln Mills and Sola both show that in cases involving private
parties, if important and identifiable federal interests are at stake that
have their roots in some explicit federal text, a federal court has the
power to create rules resolving the dispute. Although the right to sue in
these cases did not emanate from a federal statute, rights and interests
created by federal statutes provided implicit congressional authorization
and the basis for applying a federal rule of decision.
3.

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino-The Meaning of Federal
Interests

In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino'9 4 the presence of a "peculiarly federal concern" justified creating federal common law even
though neither the United States nor a federal officer was a party. 95 The
parties in Sabbatino were Banco Nacional-an instrument of the Cuban
government-and a United States commodity broker.' 9 6 The broker had
contracted to buy sugar from an American-owned Cuban company.' 97
Subsequently, the Cuban government expropriated the Cuban corporation's property and rights.198 Banco Nacional sought to recover payment
from the broker for the sugar.9 The issue was whether the broker's
defense that the expropriation was illegal was defeated by the act of state
doctrine,' °° which prohibits the judiciary of one country from inquiring
into public acts committed within its own borders by a recognized foreign sovereign.2 0 1
193. For example, in Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959), a diversity case involving
a claim for defamation against a federal official, the Court said that federal law applied to
the defense of absolute privilege. See id. at 597. Justice Harlan noted that because a
federal officer's authority to act derived from federal sources, see id., and because a privilege for statements made during the course of duty was related to the effective functioning
of the federal government, the issue was one of "peculiarly federal concern." Id. (citing
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)). In addition, because Congress had enacted no statute on the issue, the "claim of absolute privilege [had to] be
judged by federal standards, to be formulated by the courts." Id.
194. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
195. See id. at 426.
196. See id. at 401-07. Although the complaint had alleged both diversity and federal
question jurisdiction, the court of appeals, decision rested only on diversity jurisdiction.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1962), rey'd, 376
U.S. 398 (1964). The Supreme Court decided the case similarly. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
at 421 n.20.
197. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401.
198. See id. at 403.
199. See id. at 405.06.
200. Id at 415.
201. See, eg., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697
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The first question was whether state or federal law applies in a federal
diversity case.2 °2 The Court's answer was unequivocal:
[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a
basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary
and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community must be treated exclusively
as an aspect of federal law. It seems fair to assume that the Court did
not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.2 °3

Indeed, according to the Court, the problems raised by the act of state
doctrine are as intrinsically federal as those present in water apportionment and boundary disputes. 2° The Court also noted that authority to
create federal rules in those cases stemmed from federal statutes reflecting a "concern for uniformity," the Constitution and the issues' "intrinsically federal" nature.20 5 Thus, Sabbatino shows that a combination of an
intrinsically federal problem, and an implicit congressional authorization
derived from constitutional or statutory provisions, will support the crea20 6
tion of a federal rule of law applicable in both state and federal courts.
The issues raised in toxic tort cases create serious problems that Congress has regulated under its commerce clause authority. 20 7 Multi-tort
litigation arguably may not be as significant or as "intrinsically federal"
in the hierarchy of federal interests as the act of state doctrine, 20 8 and
does not present the same intrinsically federal questions as those dealing
(1976); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The act of state doctrine
emanated from The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), in
which Chief Justice Marshall wrote that a sovereign's jurisdiction within its national
boundaries is "exclusive and absolute." Id. at 135. An excellent analysis of the act of
state doctrine is contained in Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign
Sovereigns: A PoliticalQuestion Analysis, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 722 (1983).
202. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421.
203. Id. at 425. When the Sabbatino Court spoke in terms of whether the Erie Court
had rules such as the act of state doctrine in mind, it was thereby suggesting that Erie was
more a statement of the principle of federalism than an exposition of the Rules of Decision Act. Impliedly, therefore, the federal courts have the power to determine whether
federal interests predominate over the principle of federalism to justify a departure from
state law. The Second Circuit has enunciated a similar principle: "Likewise, the Erie
doctrine is inapplicable to claims or issues created or governed by federal law, even if the
jurisdiction of the federal courts rests on diversity of citizenship." Maternally Yours,
Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).
204. Id. at 427. The Court did not discuss why foreign relations questions are as "intrinsically federal" as water apportionment or boundary disputes. It appears that the
answer lies in the constitutional plan. In some areas, the needs for uniformity and for the
federal sovereign to deal with a particular problem are obvious. Foreign relations and
interstate conflicts are such problems.
205. See id. at 427 n.25. In other cases, such as border dispute cases, judicial authority
existed by virtue of their "intrinsically federal" nature.
206. See id. at 426-27.
207. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Judge Friendly has suggested that
multistate cases such as mass accidents and defamation suits are likely candidates for
federal common law. See Friendly I, supra note 26, at 117-19.
208. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
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with a foreign sovereign. This does not mean that a federal rule cannot
be adopted. Rather, it is proposed that when a multi-tort case is
presented to a federal court for adjudication, the federal court has the
power to implement the policies underlying federal texts by choosing to
apply a federal rule rather than a state rule." 9 The federal court is thus
transforming what is essentially a vertical choice of law problem into a
horizontal choice. The supremacy of federal interests requires that a federal rule be applied in that case only. Assuming federal interests are
209. The Court has explicitly recognized that cases involving an interstate conflict may
compel such a result. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92, 110 (1938). In Hinderlider,a state boundary case, the issue was apportionment
of the waters of an interstate stream. I& at 95. The dispute was not directly between two
states, which would have given the Supreme Court jurisdiction to resolve the controversy,
but rather between a state official and a private company. The Constitution grants the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction "[i]n all Cases... in which a State shall be a Party."
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Congress has executed that power by providing that "[t]he
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between
two or more States." 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982). See Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 95, 109.
The company argued that the state official's action of diverting water to meet the
state's obligation pursuant to an interstate compact violated the due process clause contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See id. at 99. The official asserted the
compact, which was entered into with the consent of Congress, as a defense. See id. at
95. Because the controversy involved apportionment of water of an interstate stream
under the terms of an interstate compact, there was a "federal question." Id. at 110.
Accordingly, without further explanation, the Court granted certiorari to review the
state court's determination, because the result of the state court's decision was to deny
"an important claim under the Constitution." I& The Court stated:
whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two
States is a question of "federal common law" upon which neither the statutes
nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.... Jurisdiction over controversies concerning rights in interstate streams is not different from those concerning boundaries. These have been recognized as presenting federal
questions.
Ii (citations omitted). In addition, the Court said that even if the dispute had been
between private parties, the result would have been the same. See id. at 110-11.
The orthodox view is that federal common law, because it is federal law, is binding on
the states. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962); U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Merrill,
supra note 22, at 6-7; see also Hill II, supra note 48, at 1073-79 (supremacy clause requires that federal common law be binding on the states). This Article concludes that,
federal courts adjudicating multi-tort cases should be able to choose to apply federal
common law as a matter of a choice of law analysis. Thus, when this Article refers to
federal common law, it does not necessarily refer to binding federal rules. If, however, a
court finds that such strong federal interests exist that the case can be said to arise under
federal common law, giving the court federal subject matter jurisdiction, such law should
be binding on the states as well.
Under the analysis in this Article, applying federal common law in multi-tort cases will
not always displace state law. Mass tort cases usually do not arise under federal common
law. See infra notes 263-78 and accompanying text. They are diversity cases in which
the plaintiffs are bringing essentially state law causes of action for their personal injuries
or property damage. If litigants choose to remain in state court, the state court should be
free to apply whatever jurisdiction's law is appropriate. If, however, litigants choose federal court, and the case becomes a multi-tort case by virtue of a § 1407 transfer, see infra
notes 309, 320-22, 338-49 and accompanying text, the federal court may exercise independent judgment on what law should apply and may indeed choose a federal rule of
decision.
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demonstrated by the enactment of a federal statute regulating the product or substance, a conflict among the interests of numerous states concerning the product or substance presents an intrinsically federal
problem to which a federal rule may apply when the litigation is conducted in federal court.
4. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee-Expedience and Interstate Harm
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee2 1 ° involved the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction over controversies between two or more states. 22 ' Illinois
brought a public nuisance cause of action against various Wisconsin governmental entities, seeking an order requiring the defendants to stop
dumping pollutants into Lake Michigan, an interstate water.2 12
The Court first addressed the question of whether the dispute before it

was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district court.
Significantly, the Court held that the case arose under the "laws" of the
United States because 2 the
word "laws" "embraced claims founded on
13
federal common law."
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Douglas, the Court found
that general federal environmental and pollution statutes evidenced Congress' concern for protecting the responsibility and right of the states to
regulate matters such as those in City of Milwaukee.21 4 However, the
Court also observed that Congress made clear that federal law controlled
in cases involving interstate waters. 2 5 Despite its recognition that the
remedy sought by Illinois was "not within the precise scope of remedies
prescribed by Congress, 21 6 the Court declared that "the remedies which
Congress provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available.
'It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where fed210. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
211. See id. at 93. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide controversies
between two or more states under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982). However, the Court held
that because Milwaukee was a political subdivision, and not a "State," see Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972), jurisdiction could not lie under § 1251(a). See 28
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982). See infra note 223. Jurisdiction would be proper under
§ 125 1(b)(3), however, because a political subdivision is a citizen of the state, see Bullard
v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179, 187 (1933), and the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over actions between a state and citizen of another state, see 28 U.S.C. 1251(b)(3)
(1982). This distinction is critical because it shows that the multistate aspect of the case
was not derived from the fact of a state-state conflict, but rather from a conflict between
only one sovereign and the citizens of another state. Multi-tort cases, to the extent that
applying one sovereign's law operates to deprive citizens of another state of a right, are
thus analogous to City of Milwaukee.
212. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93.
213. Id. at 99 ("Federal courts have an extensive responsibility of fashioning rules of
substantive law.... These rules are as fully 'laws' of the United States as if they had been
enacted by Congress.") (quoting Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 393 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). But see
supra note 29.
214. See City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 101-03.
215. See id. at 102.
216. Id. at 103.

1985] MULTI-TORT CASES AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW

199

eral rights are concerned.' "217
City of Milwaukee exemplifies the expediency factor because the interstate nature of the conflict, together with the implied right to provide a
remedy when federal statutes give rise to federal rights, and not the nature of the parties, caused the Court to decide that the case before it
"arose under federal common law." 21 8 Indeed, the Court recognized
that "only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means"
for solving these kinds of problems.2" 9 Although the Court in City of
Milwaukee'- ° recognized that a peculiar federal problem may eventually
lead the legislative branch to "pre-empt" the area, 22 1 it stated that until
Congress acted explicitly, the federal courts had the power to create the
applicable legal rules in what otherwise would have been merely a state
law nuisance case.-The Court has not hesitated to declare a need for a federal rule not
expressly granted in the Constitution or a federal statute in order to solve
a unique problem when sufficient federal interests exist. Part III devel217. Id (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)).
218. Id at 105 n.6.
219. Id at 107 n.9 (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971)).
220. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
221. Id at 107. Indeed, the Court's prophecy came true. Five months after the
Court's decision, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
In 1981, the Court held that the amendment, which totally rewrote and restructured the
Act, was a comprehensive regulatory program that preempted the area and precluded
application of federal common law. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 31719 (1981). A similar regulatory program could be developed in the area of multi-torts.
See infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
222. Two recent Supreme Court cases may be cited as evidence that the Court has cut
back on the broad authority of federal courts to fashion federal common law. In Texas
Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981), the Court, citing Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963), stated that a federal court's power to formulate federal common law was limited to "few and restricted" instances, and declined to fashion a
federal rule of contribution in antitrust actions brought under the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) or the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1982). Similarly, in
Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94-95 (1981), the Court
declined to fashion a federal common law right to contribution in actions under the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
These decisions, however, do not foreclose application of federal common law in multitort cases. In both cases, Congress had enacted comprehensive statutes that provided the
plaintiff's cause of action and express remedies. Given the degree of detail, it would be
difficult to argue that Congress forgot to include a specific provision such as a right of
contribution among defendants. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979) (given the degree of specificity in the federal act, Court refused
to find that Congress forgot to enact a provision enabling private individuals to sue for
damages). Indeed, City of Milwaukee teaches that once Congress speaks explicitly, the
opportunity for "an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears." 451
U.S. at 314. There is still room for the federal courts to exercise their interstitial lawmaking functions in the case of multi-torts. Not until Congress passes a comprehensive federal products liability and toxic tort act providing individuals with a right to sue in
federal courts for personal injuries will the federal court's power to create federal common law cease. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
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ops an analytic framework for determining when federal common law
should be created and applied to displace state law in multi-tort cases.
III.

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING FEDERAL
COMMON LAW IN MULTI-TORT CASES

A. A Choice of Law Approach to the Problem
One should separate the following issues: what jurisdiction provides or
creates the cause of action and right to sue; what jurisdiction provides or
fashions the standards of conduct; and what jurisdiction determines the
available remedies. Indeed, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York2 23 clearly distin224 Clearfield Trust 225
guishes between the right to sue and the remedy.

be different 226
shows that the jurisdiction providing the right to sue may
227
from the one providing the applicable legal standards.

223. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
224. See id. at 105-06; see also Al Bishop Agency, Inc. v. Lithonia-Division of Nat'l
Serv. Indus., Inc., 474 F. Supp. 828, 835 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (court applied federal remedy
despite explicit state rule).
225. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
226. See id. at 365-67. State law provided the cause of action, federal law applied to
the standard of conduct.
227. See In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). Of course, it might be argued that a cause of action may be
implied from federal statutes. Compare Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21 (1981) (no implied right of action under Federal
Water Pollution Control and other acts), California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-93,
297-98 (1981) (no implied right under provision of River and Harbor Act), and Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 74-77 (1975) (no implied right under criminal statute limiting political
contributions) with Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24
(1979) (no implied right to damages under § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act; finding
implied right to rescission of investment advisory contract under § 216), and J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (finding implied right of action under § 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act). However, recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting
some of the federal statutes that regulate the industries, substances or products involved
in multi-tort cases have declined to imply a private right of action. See Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth., 453 U.S. at 18; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298.
The key inquiry in implied right of action cases is whether Congress intended to provide private citizens with a right to sue for damages or other relief when Congress has
failed to provide explicitly for such relief. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth., 453
U.S. at 15. While the Court has been increasingly concerned with these cases, see id. at
24-25 (Stevens, J., concurring), it has recently deviated from its earlier path of generally
finding an implied right to sue, id. at 24; see also D. Currie, supra note 51, at 457-60
(discussing recent Supreme Court hostility towards finding implied causes of action).
Justice Stevens, concurring in Middlesex County, suggested that the reason for this is
quite obvious: "The touchstone now is congressional intent ....
Because legislative history is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a
specific procedure that the statute itself fails to mention, that touchstone will further
restrict the availability of private remedies." Middlesex County Sewerage Auth., 453 U.S.
at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Accordingly, courts are unlikely to
provide a federal remedy by finding that plaintiffs in multi-tort cases have an implied
right of action under the federal regulatory statutes.
A conclusion that no private right of action exists, however, does not foreclose the
court's authority to fashion federal common law. The questions are distinct. Northwest
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It is axiomatic that in multi-tort cases the laws of the fifty states create

the cause of action on which the plaintiffs sue." 8 A much more significant and thorny question remains, however. How should a federal court
decide whether to apply state or federal law to each of the issues raised in
a multi-tort case?
As demonstrated in Part I, in multi-tort cases, questions such as bur-

den of proof, defenses, remedies and statutes of limitations are neither
strictly substantive nor procedural. 2

9

Part I also showed that it is easy,

but unwise, to fall into the quagmire of determining whether an issue is
substantive or procedural in the multi-tort context.230 Thus, rather than
characterizing the issue presented as substantive or procedural, the federal courts must be allowed to consider whether to develop and apply

federal common law to these issues regardless of their labels in a choice
of law analysis 231 because a multi-tort case should be viewed as a hybrid.

Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981); see also Merrill, supra note 22, at 4, 48 n.205
(federal common law may be created without a finding of specific congressional intent to
create a cause of action). But see Comment, Implied Causes of Action. A Product of
Statutory Construction or The FederalCommon Law Power?, 51 U. Colo. L Rev. 355,

369-97 (1980) (existence of implied cause of action best decided under principled framework of federal common law power).
228. As discussed in Part I, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), compels application of state substantive law. See iL at 471-72.
229. There are relatively few rules that can be treated as purely substantive or procedural. As Hanna suggests, "[t]he line between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the
legal context changes. 'Each implies different variables depending upon the particular
problem for which it is used.'" Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945)); see also Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma
FacingDraftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 353, 364-67 (1969)

(discussing difficulty in determining whether state evidence rules deal with substantive or
procedural matters). Indeed, the words "substantive" and "procedural" are merely conclusory labels. See Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision Act

and the Erie Doctrine, 85 Yale L.J. 678, 703 (1976) ("The line separating 'substantive'
and 'procedural' law has varied.., because, in each problem area, a set of considerations
appropriate to the particular context has determined at what point the line was drawn to
divide legal rules into two groups. The results of the line-drawing have been summarized
in expressions about substantive and procedural law.") (footnote ommitted).
The legal context changes in mass toxic tort cases. In a case like Erie, in which only
one state's policy is implicated, the appropriate standard of care clearly may be and traditionally has been labeled substantive. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. In a multistate case,
however, the conflicting state policies, together with the opportunity for a just resolution
of the dispute, compel a federal court to consider whether the federal interests involved
justify displacing the state rules. Thus, the issues should not be treated as substantive.
See supra notes 96-97, 112-18 and accompanying text.
230. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-66 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Base of the Conflict of Laws
154-83 (1942); Ely, supra note 25, at 724-27; Tunks, Categorization and Federalism:
"Substance" and "Procedure"after Erie Railroadv. Tompkins, 34 111. L Rev. 271, 279-88

(1939). See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
231. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938), Justice Brandeis wrote that the
federal court in New York could not disregard Pennsylvania common law. He never
explained why Pennsylvania and not New York law applied. Two alternative explanations are possible. Professor Hart opined that Justice Brandeis assumed that a federal
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A plaintiff's cause of action or right to sue for negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty may arise under state law. Yet, the federal
court would rely on federal choice of law principles in determining what law applies. See
Hart, supra note 73, at 514 n.84 ("In Erie itself, Justice Brandeis seemed to assume that a
federal court should think for itself on conflicts problems."). But, given the prevailing
choice of law methodology-lex loci delicti-see supra note 56, the more probable explanation is that Pennsylvania law would apply in a tort case involving a Pennsylvania citizen injured in Pennsylvania. See Friendly I, supra note 25, at 401.
Three years after Erie, the Supreme Court held that in cases in which Erie applied,
federal courts must apply the conflict of law rules of the state in which the court sits. See
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). See supra note 17.
In Klaxon, a nonresident brought suit against a Delaware corporation in a Delaware
federal court on a New York contract. See id. at 494-95. The Third Circuit had failed to
examine Delaware law and held that a New York statute providing for interest should be
applied, apparently because it deemed the New York rule to be the better rule. See id. at
495-96. Without a cogent explanation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a
determination of what law a Delaware state court would apply in such a case. See id. at
496-97. According to the Court, to do otherwise "would do violence to the principle of
uniformity within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is based.... It is not for
the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent 'general law'
of conflict of laws." Id. at 496. On remand, the Third Circuit concluded that Delaware
would apply the New York statute. See Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d
820, 825 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 685 (1942).
The Klaxon rule was reaffirmed ten years ago in a per curiam opinion. See Day &
Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam). Thus, in multi-tort
cases brought in a federal court, or in any other diversity case, a federal court in New
York, for example, may have "to determine what the New York courts would think the
California [or any other interested state] courts would think on an issue about which
neither has thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960),
vacated and remanded, 365 U.S. 293 (1961). Both the "unreality of the process," C.
Wright, supra note 50, at 369, and the unfairness that is created because the Klaxon rule
perpetuates state-to-state forum shopping, have led many commentators to argue that
federal courts should be free to develop their own choice of law rules, independent of the
states, and that the Klaxon rule is not constitutionally compelled. See, e.g., Baxter,
Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 41-42 (1963); Hart, supra note
73, at 513-15 (1954); Hill I, supra note 25, at 455-56; Horowitz, Toward a FederalCommon Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 1191, 1193 (1967); Mishkin II, supra note
74, at 802-10; Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law and Federal
Common Law, 41 Law & Contemp. Probs. 105, 114 (Spring 1977). But see Cavers, The
ChangingChoice-of-Law Processand the Federal Courts, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 732,
737 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Cavers I]; Cavers, Special Memorandum on Change in
Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, in ALI, Study of the
Division of Jurisdictions between State and Federal Courts (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as Cavers II].
Because of the interstate nature of harm presented in multi-tort cases, and because
Congress has provided a procedural tool, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982), to assist in the just
resolution of these kinds of cases, see infra notes 309, 320-22, 338-49 and accompanying
text, there is even less reason for a federal court to be constrained to apply the Klaxon
rule. See Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in JudicialPrecedent,40 Tex. L. Rev. 509,
522 (1962); Cavers I, supra, at 745-47; Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of
Laws, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1236 n.62 (1946); Weintraub I, supra note 26, at 253-56.
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941) is not to the contrary. In Griffin, the state
choice of law rule applied even though some parties were joined pursuant to the Federal
Interpleader Act, currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982), and nationwide service of
process was authorized by the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982). See Griffin, 313 U.S. at 503.
Thus, assignees of a contract made in New York could be subject to whatever law Texas
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courts are not without power to provide a remedy that may differ from
one rendered by a state court. 3 2 The myriad federal statutes regulating
various hazardous products and substances2 33 together with the implied
authority to create rules to "do justice" when cases are consolidated pursuant to section 1407,234 provide authority for a federal court to create a
federal rule when competing state interests and identifiable federal interests are presented. If a federal court decides that uniquely federal interests235 are presented, and substantive state policies clash or are unclear,
implied congressional authority
for common law lawmaking exists, and
the state policies must yield.2 36
B. ProceduralEnhancement: The Role of FederalProcedure in
Justifying Application of FederalCommon Law
In the context of multi-tort cases, the commerce clause, the federal
regulatory statutes, and the equal protection clause provide the basis for
Congress and the federal courts to find sufficient federal interests to support application of federal law.2 37 Section 1407, a procedural rule, exists
would apply even though the assignees could not have been subjected to Texas jurisdiction without the use of the Interpleader Act. See id. at 506.
Griffin, however, is distinguishable from a case in which there is a transfer of multi-tort
cases pursuant to § 1407. The Multidistrict Litigation Panel decides which district court
will conduct the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982). In the case of interpleader, the
plaintiffs determine which court will adjudicate the lawsuit. Moreover, allowing the federal court as a relatively dispassionate observer to balance the competing state interests,
which are likely to cancel each other out, along with whatever federal interests are discernible from federal regulatory statutes, best ensures that § 1407 leads to the just results
envisioned by Congress when it enacted the provision. See H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1898, 1899. As in
admiralty cases and boundary dispute cases, the interests of the respective states involved
in a multi-tort case would be furthered if a uniform rule were considered by a disinterested decisionmaker. Cf L. Tribe, supra note 44, at 116 n.7 (states could not by themselves achieve uniform or objective law).
232. See eg., Hill II, supra note 48, at 1024, 1027 (1967) (remedial implications of a
rule are distinct from substantive content of a rule); Federal Common La, supra note
126, at 1523 (distinguishing between right and remedy).
233. See supra note 45.
234. See infra notes 309, 320-22, 338-49 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 50-51, 128, 207-10 and accompanying text.
237. By its terms, the equal protection clause, U.S. Cost. amend. XIV, § 1, does not
apply to the federal government. The clause states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Iad
The Supreme Court, however, has held that the fifth amendment's due process clause,
U.S. Const. amend. V, although not containing equal protection language, forbids unjustifiable discrimination. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Indeed,
[t]he "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
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to assist federal courts in expediting the fair adjudication of mass tort
claims by providing for a transfer of related cases to one federal district
court for pretrial purposes.23 The express command of Congress when
it enacted section 1407 was that the statute be used to assure "the 'just
unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the
two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized,
discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
Id. In addition, the Court has stated that "[our] approach to Fifth Amendment equal
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wissenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
See supra note 62.
238. Section 1407 provides in pertinent part:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made
by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon
its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience
of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such
actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was
transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however,
That the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or thirdparty claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder is
remanded....
(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may be initiated by(i) the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation upon its own initiative, or
(ii) motion filed with the panel by a party in any action in which transfer
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under this section may be
appropriate. A copy of such motion shall be filed in the district court in which
the moving party's action is pending.
The panel shall give notice to the parties in all actions in which transfers for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are contemplated, and such
notice shall specify the time and place of any hearing to determine whether such
transfer shall be made. Orders of the panel to set a hearing and other orders of
the panel issued prior to the order either directing or denying transfer shall be
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court in which a transfer hearing is
to be or has been held. The panel's order of transfer shall be based upon a
record of such hearing at which material evidence may be offered by any party
to an action pending in any district that would be affected by the proceedings
under this section, and shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of
law based upon such record. Orders of transfer and such other orders as the
panel may make thereafter shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district
court of the transferee district and shall be effective when thus filed. The clerk
of the transferee district court shall forthwith transmit a certified copy of the
panel's order to transfer to the clerk of the district court from which the action
is being transferred. An order denying transfer shall be filed in each district
wherein there is a case pending in which the motion for transfer has been made.
(d) Thejudicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of seven circuit
and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of the
United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit. The concurrence
of four members shall be necessary to any action by the panel ....
(f) The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure....
28 U.S.C. § 1487 (1982) (emphasis in original).

1985] MULTI-TORT CASES AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW

205

and efficient conduct'" of multidistrict proceedings." 9
The Court in Hanna v. Plumer stated that Congress' power to enact
procedural rules supports an implied power in the courts to regulate in
the murky area that is found in the midst of the substantive/procedural
continuum. As discussed in Part I, the issues in multi-tort cases lie in
this range.'
Accordingly, the congressional mandate in enacting section 1407 can be satisfied only if federal courts can freely examine the
federal policies underlying the relevant regulatory schemes to determine
whether federal common law should be applied. By doing this, courts
will ensure equal administration of the law with respect to the parties in
mass tort litigation, and will also ensure that any federal policy embodied
in the statute is not undermined.
Thus, while most courts have accepted without question the rule that
requires that the transferee court apply the law the transferor court
would have applied,24 1 it is not unlikely that Congress intended the transferee court to consider applying a uniform rule to expedite the disposition of the consolidated lawsuits.2 4a
239. H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 1898, 1899. Section 1407(a) thus provides that transfers will be made when to
do so "will promote the just and efficient conduct of such [transferred] actions." 28
U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982).
240. See supra notes 96-97, 112-17 and accompanying text.
241. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 632-33 (1964);see, e.g., In re Armored Car
Antitrust Litig., 462 F. Supp. 394, 396 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Helicopter Crash in Ger.
on Sept. 26, 1975, 443 F. Supp. 447, 449 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Boston, Mass. on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (D.Mass. 1975); In re King
Resources Co. Sees. Litig., 385 F. Supp. 588, 590 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974) (per curiam); Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam,
516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Four Seasons Secs. Laws Litig., 370 F. Supp. 219, 228
(W.D. Okla. 1974); In re Plumbing Fixtures Litig., 342 F. Supp. 756, 758 (J.P.M.D.L
1972) (per curiam); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H. on Oct. 25, 1968, 314
F. Supp. 62, 63 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970) (per curiara); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Indeed,
some courts fail to consider the issue. See, eg., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago,
Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 605 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981);
Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975).
242. Section 1407 contains no choice of law provision. This is probably because the
statute was originally enacted to deal with the problems raised in a mass antitrust conspiracy case in which federal law clearly would apply. See H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1898, 1899. Some
courts have questioned whether it is appropriate to apply transferor state law in all
§ 1407 transfer cases. See, e.g., In re The Pittsburgh & LE.R.R. Sees. and Antitrust
Litig., 543 F.2d 1058, 1065 n.19 (3d Cir. 1976). The Third Circuit stated:
All of these opinions assumed that the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack.. . determines the interpretation offederal law which the transferor district would apply. It is difficult to understand why this should be so since Van Dusen v.
Barrack involved conflicting state wrongful death policies, while in theory at
least, federal law, in its area of competence, is assumed to be nationally uniform, whether or not it is in fact.
Ia (emphasis in original). Accordingly, because of the federal interest in multi-tort cases,
the transferee court should be free to develop and apply the federal rule without being
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A uniform federal rule should be considered by a court when federal
regulatory schemes relate to the product that caused the harm. Indeed,
if federal interests predominate and a federal rule is not adopted, enforcing divergent state standards of liability may undermine the salutory purposes of the federal acts. 4 3 Moreover, a federal rule may be needed to
vindicate the anti-bias purpose of diversity jurisdiction 244 and to prevent
the equivalent of the equal protection problems raised in Erie.24 Thus,
in a case involving a product that has injured plaintiffs throughout the
United States, a section 1407 transfer, together with interstate harm and
a federal regulatory scheme, provides the basis for applying a federal

common law rule.
Federal interests, as evidenced in regulatory statutes, are enhanced
when procedural devices such as section 1407246 are used. Until this deconstrained by any consideration of what the transferor courts would have done. For
example, the Seventh Circuit applied a federal rule of contribution because the rights and
liabilities of the United States--the defendant and third party defendant in an airplane
crash case-were peculiarly federal in nature. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d
400, 403-04 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). Although the Kohr case
has been criticized, see C. Wright, supra note 50 at 392-93, the case was recently cited
with approval by the Supreme Court in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union,
451 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1981). The Kohr court did not even consider Van Dusen, although
the case was one consolidated pursuant to § 1407. See Kohr, 504 F.2d at 401-02.
Indeed, when multi-tort cases are transferred for pretrial proceedings pursuant to
§ 1407, the considerations that prompted the Van Dusen opinion are not necessarily present. The Van Dusen rule was established to prevent plaintiffs from being deprived by
defendants of the advantageous law that would be applied by the original forum. See Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964). In a § 1407 transfer, nonresident defendants
do not control where the action will be transferred. Indeed, § 1407(c)(i) provides that
"the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation [may] upon its own initiative" commence
proceedings for transfer under the section. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i) (1982). Moreover, the
judicial panel may transfer the cases "to any district." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982).
Therefore, even if the defendants sought a transfer pursuant to § 1407(c)(ii), they would
not be able to dictate what law would be applied pursuant to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See supra note 231 and accompanying text. Finally, the
law is unsettled on whether the Van Dusen rule applies when a § 1404(a) transfer is
requested by the plaintiff. Compare Carson v. U-Haul Co., 434 F.2d 916, 918 (6th Cir.
1970) (law of the transferee state is applied when § 1404(a) transfer is requested by the
plaintiff) with Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 792 (10th Cir. 1979) (law
of transferor state is applied). For a general discussion of these problems, see Note,
Choice of Law in FederalCourt After Transfer of Venue, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 149 (1977).
243. See supra notes 131-222 and accompanying text.
244. Indeed, Professor Keeffe suggested that diversity jurisdiction was intended to give
the federal courts freedom to choose the appropriate rule of law. See Keeffe, supra note
19, at 324 (citing The Federalist No. 80, at 588-90 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1875)).
Moreover, to the extent that states do not mechanically apply their own precedent, Erie is
inconsistent with the basic premise of diversity jurisdiction. See L. Tribe, supra note 44,
at 117; Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 Yale L.J. 762, 775-76 (1941); Hart,
supra note 73, at 510; Hill I, supra note 25, at 454.
245. Cf Baxter, supra note 231, at 39 (legal doctrine, not just the greater likelihood of
objectivity, was the element intended to distinguish federal from state courts); Ely, supra
note 25, at 712-13 (creation of an unbiased tribunal was primary aim of diversity jurisdiction). See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of these problems.
246. To be sure, Congress did not expressly intend to enlarge the substantive rights of
the litigants by enacting § 1407. See id.; see also Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat.
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vice is used, the case has not become a truly multi-tort litigation; rather,
the case arguably retains its character as essentially a single plaintiff, single defendant lawsuit. Using section 1407 provides the court with the
opportunity to engage in the kind of federal-state balancing urged in
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,24 and the power to regu1064 (1934) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)) (federal rules of procedure
enacted pursuant thereto are not to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right").
The question, however, is which jurisdiction should apply the standards that together
make up the substantive rights of the parties. Section 1407 is not a tool for the use of
litigants and does not by itself allow a federal court to create a "substantive" rule.
Rather, it is primarily a tool of the federal judiciary to assist in achieving the just and
efficient adjudication of complex cases. See infra notes 309, 320-22, 338-49 and accompanying text. By definition, a § 1407 transfer would be permitted when lawsuits were filed
throughout the country. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). When state substantive policies clash
such that no "substantive" issue is presented for Erie purposes and interstate harm is
coupled in multi-tort cases with the federal interest in doing justice--an interest that
underlies § 1407-the court must do more than supervise discovery. See infra notes 255371 and accompanying text. But see Transgrud, supra note 1, at 804.
Indeed, even though the scant legislative history of § 1407 suggests that the purpose of
the transfer is to facilitate discovery, courts have often interpreted these powers more
expansively. See C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure:
§ 3866, at 378 (1976); Levy, Complex MultidistrictLitigation and the Federal Courts, 40
Fordhan L. Rev. 41, 59-60 (1971). One reason is that § 1407 provides that the action
"may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrialproceedings."
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982) (emphasis added). Many pretrial proceedings require the resolution of substantive issues. For example, one important pretrial proceeding is the motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Transferee courts have the power to
decide such motions. See, eg., In re New York City Mun. Secs. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51
(2d Cir. 1978); Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 668 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 956 (1974); In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513, 514 (J.P.M.D.L.
1970). In addition, for all practical purposes, as Judge Friendly pointed out, once the
§ 1407 transfer is effected, the transferor courts are unlikely to see the case again. See In
re New York City Mun. Sees. Litig., 572 F.2d at 51. For example, in the Bendectin
litigation, 315 suits were transferred pursuant to § 1407 and another 253 filed in the
Southern District of Ohio. See In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239, 240
(S.D. Ohio), mandamus granted, 749 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1984). The court however, refused to certify the case as a class action for trial. Id at 240 n.4. Once it became clear
that the case could be settled, the court certified it for that limited purpose. See id. at
241-42. Although the Sixth Circuit later issued a mandamus ordering the district court
to vacate its certification order, the court of appeals acknowledged precedent for the notion that a class may be certified exclusively for settlement purposes. See In re Bendectin
Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 & n.10 (6th Cir. 1984); see also In re Beef Indus.
Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 171, 178 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding temporary settlement
class consisting of all persons, except defendants, engaged in raising fat cattle and who
sold a certain amount of cattle per year), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981). It is clear that
in most cases the transferee court decides the case. But see Daniels v. United States, 704
F.2d 587, 588, 591 (11th Cir. 1983) (Swine Flu cases remanded to transferor districts and
state law applied). Furthermore, the Multidistrict Litigation Panel and several courts
have approved the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) by a transferee district court judge to retain
the consolidated cases for trial. See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 11, 78 F.R.D. 561, 569 (1978); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d
810, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447
F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery Litig., 424 F.
Supp. 504, 507 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976). But see Transgrud, supra note 1, at 804-05.
247. 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
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late in the murky area discussed in Hanna.248 As a result, a court might
apply a federal rule to certain issues in a case. Whether one characterizes
the rules thus created as substantive or procedural 249 is irrelevant. The

point is that Erie does not require application of state law when conflicting state interests are present and sufficient federal interests are
implicated.25
C. Implying a FederalRule of Decision

In two recent cases, the Second and Fifth Circuits refused to apply
federal common law in mass toxic tort cases. In Jackson v. Johns-

Manville Sales Corp.,251 the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt a federal rule

on the issue of punitive damages in an asbestos case.2 52 In In re "Agent
Orange" ProductLiability Litigation,25 3 the Second Circuit held that the
product liability action brought by United States veterans against several
chemical companies that produced herbicides containing Agent Orange
25 4
was not the kind of case properly "governed by federal common law."
These cases will now be examined to demonstrate how a federal court
should determine, as a choice of law question, whether to exercise its
power to apply a federal or state rule in mass toxic tort cases.
1. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation
"'Agent Orange,"255 described by some as sui generis, 2 6 is in fact the
archetypal mass toxic tort case. Indeed, although the plaintiffs' claims
were unique because they related to the veterans' exposure to Agent Orange while serving in Vietnam,2 57 the case clearly had "national dimen25 9
Lawsuits were filed in twenty-five federal district courts,
sions. '
248. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See supra notes 118-30.
249. See supra notes 96-97, 112-17 and accompanying text.
250. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); Friendly I,
supra note 25, at 407. Indeed, since Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the
Court has made clear that Erie requires application of state law when the policies of
avoidance of state-federal forum shopping and equal administration of a state's law are
advanced. This is simply another way of saying that Erie requires applying state law to
avoid thwarting the state's interest in application of its own rule. As a corollary, if the
state's interest is not advanced or if the policy of equal administration of justice is undermined, there is no violation of the spirit of Erie by not applying state law.
251. 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985).
252. See id. at 1322, 1327.
253. 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
254. Id. at 995.
255. 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
256. See id. at 995 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting); Speech by Chief Judge Weinstein,
American College of Trial Lawyers 1 (Mar. 19, 1985) (Preliminary Reflections on Managing Disasters) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review).
257. See In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 989.
258. Id. at 996 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
259. See id. (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
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with 2,400,000 potential plaintiffs," ° against five of the largest chemical
companies in the United States.26 ' All the federal actions, many of
which were class actions,
were eventually consolidated in the Eastern
262
District of New York.

In "'AgentOrange," the court was presented with a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 63 Thus, the question facing the
Second Circuit was whether the case arose under federal common law,
thereby establishing federal question jurisdiction. 26
The problem "'AgentOrange" presents in the context of this Article is
that both the majority and dissent viewed the question of whether to
apply federal common law as an all or nothing proposition. 265 The majority concluded that the case did not arise under federal common law
because there was no "identifiable federal policy at stake in this litigation
that warrants the creation of federal common law rules., 2 6 6 The court
distinguished the private lawsuit before it from cases such as Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States 267 and United States v. Standard Oil Co.2 68
because the case did not "directly implicate the rights and duties of the
United States. ' 269 The majority believed that uniformity is not a federal
interest270 in a private lawsuit not involving substantial rights or duties of
the federal government.27 1 In addition, the majority noted that even if a
260. See id(Feinberg, C.J., dissenting). There were at least 800 named plaintiffs. See
id at 988.

261. See id. at 995 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
262. See id (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting). In addition, at one time it appeared that the
claims could amount to billions of dollars. See id. at 996 (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting).
263. See In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 995 (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting).
264. See id.
at 988. If a case is governed by federal common law, it "arise[s] under...
the Laws of the United States," U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, and thus becomes a basis for
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
265. See In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 995, 999 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
266. Id at 993.
267. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
268. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
269. In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 993.
270. See id

271. See id, A key question presented in multi-tort cases is how the character of the
parties should affect the federal court's decision to apply federal common law. In Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the Court said that the "character of the parties" was not dispositive in determining whether federal common law applied. Id. at 105
n.6. In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981), however, the Court sidestepped the question whether a private party seeking
damages could invoke federal common law, see id at 21, because in City of Milwaukee,
the Court had declared that federal common law was no longer available because Congress had enacted preemptive legislation in that area, see Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at
21-22. See supra note 222. In other cases, such as Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964), Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), and Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), however, the character of the parties
was irrelevant. See supra notes 161, 192, 196 and accompanying text.
The character of the parties, however, does have some bearing on the question whether
federal common law may be created. For example, in Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956), the plaintiff bank, alleging diversity jurisdiction,
sued two individual defendants-the Federal Reserve Bank and another state bank-for
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federal statute creates private rights, Congress has occasionally allowed
federal courts to borrow state law to fill in the gaps.272
The Second Circuit indicated that it would take an extremely narrow
view of the use of federal common law. The majority could not decide
whether the government's interest in the welfare of its veterans outweighed its interest in protecting its relations with government contractors. 7 3 It concluded that the issue of which group should be favored is
the kind of policy matter that should be left to Congress.2 74 Because
converting bonds that were guaranteed for payment by the United States. See id. at 3031. The principal issue at trial was whether the bonds were taken in good faith. See id. at
31. The trial judge charged the jury on the issue of burden of proof under state law, See
id. Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit reversed and found that federal law placed the
burden on the plaintiff. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n. v. Rocco, 226 F.2d
297, 299 (3d Cir. 1955) (en banc) (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943)), rev'd sub nom. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956). In addition, the circuit court had found that there could be no bad faith on the
part of the defendant state bank because as a matter of federal law the bonds were not
"overdue" when presented for payment. Id. at 300-01. The Supreme Court reversed.
Parnell,352 U.S. at 34. Although federal securities may "radiate interests in transactions
between private parties" the Parnell case was "purely between private parties and [did]
not touch the rights and duties of the United States." Parnell, 352 U.S. at 33. Any
federal interest was "far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern." Id. at 33-34. Thus, the
question of good faith was governed by state law. See id. at 34.
The Court conceded, however, that the question of "overdueness" was governed by
federal law because it involved "the interpretation of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the Government bonds." Id. In addition, the Court admitted that "the
presence of a federal interest" is not precluded "in all situations merely because it is a suit
between private parties." Id. Thus, because the transactions in Parnellall took place in
Pennsylvania, see id., the case does not foreclose use of a federal rule in mass toxic tort
cases in which the tort is not similarly localized in one jurisdiction.
272. See In re "'AgentOrange," 635 F.2d at 994 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1128 (1981). The court's example-the borrowing of state statutes of limitation for cases
arising under § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act-ironically, is no longer true.
In Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the Court decided to fashion a federal rule for § 301 cases out of respect for the need for uniformity.
See id. at 172. But see Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (1985) (Court in § 1983
case will borrow state personal injury statute of limitations). Another statute, however,
explicitly seems to require federal courts to apply state substantive law. The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), explicitly makes the tort liability of the United
States dependent on the "law of the place where the act or omission occurred." This
command is not inconsistent with the proposal in this Article. Clearly, where Congress
has spoken, its authority is paramount. See supra notes 51, 333 and accompanying text.
This seems to explain why the Swine Flu cases were remanded to local district courts for
trial and why state law was applied. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 704 F.2d 587,
588, 591 (11th Cir. 1985). Even though the Swine Flu cases could be characterized as
multi-torts, the courts had to follow the express mandate of Congress in the Federal Tort
Claims Act to use the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Congress
expressly directed the judiciary to proceed as if there were single tort cases once the
pretrial discovery phase ended. The problem in the case of private party multi-tort litigation is that Congress has not explicitly provided a clear direction, but rather has enacted
various statutes that evince federal policies. Accordingly, the federal courts have power
to fashion rules to effectuate that policy until Congress speaks explicitly.
273. See In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 994.
274. See id.
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Congress had failed to enact a statute to deal with the issues raised in the
"'Agent Orange" case, the court declined to devise judicially such a
scheme. 275 Thus, it appears that federal common law may not be applied
unless the government's interest is essentially monolithic.
The majority's approach confuses the need to find some federal interest to justify applying federal common law with the need to find some
federal interest to determine the content of the common law rule. This
Article maintains that a federal court is free to consider whether to develop a common law rule in appropriate cases.27 6 The federal interest
need not dictate the content of the rule; determining the rule's substance
is the role of the federal courts.2 77 As the "'AgentOrange" majority necalways going to create a rule promoting
essarily conceded, a court is not
278
a substantive federal interest.
For example, in United States v. Standard Oil Co.2791 the question was
whether the United States could seek indemnification for its expenses
from a private party due to injuries suffered by a United States serviceman."' The Court decided that the question was one of federal common
law because of the government's interest in a uniform rule. 28 However,
the Court declined to adopt the rule of liability urged by the govern23
ment, 282 believing that it was a matter better decided by Congress. 1
The federal interest in a case not involving the government as a party
might not be readily apparent, and therefore the need for uniformity
might be less apparent. However, as even the "Agent Orange" Second
Circuit majority conceded, 2" federal interests do exist in mass toxic tort
cases.
The distinction between finding a federal interest sufficient to justify
applying federal common law in a choice of law context and finding
enough of an interest sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction is
critical.28 5 In many federal common law cases, the question is whether
275. See id at 994-95.
276. See supra Part II.

277. See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 163-64 (1982);
Friendly, The Gap in Law Making-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63

Colum. L. Rev. 787, 788-89 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Friendly II].
278. See In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 993.

279. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
280. See id at 302.
281. See id at 307-11.
282. See id at 313-16.
283. See id at 316-17.

284. See Inre "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 995 ("the federal government has obvious
interests").
285. See Inre "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 694-97 (FD.N.Y.
1984). Further, because the Second Circuit was considering the issue of federal common
law in a jurisdictional context rather than in a choice of law context, see supra notes 26364 and accompanying text, it never decided whether sufficient federal interests existed
with respect to specific issues in the case so that federal common law could be applied to
those issues. The court was arguably correct in concluding that the federal interests
presented were insufficient to support federal question subject matter jurisdiction, see In
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the case "arises under" federal common law so that federal question subject matter jurisdiction exists.2" 6 Federal question jurisdiction is lim-

ited. 8 7 Thus, when a court needs to decide whether federal common law
exists in order to determine whether there is federal question subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be required to demonstrate a significant and identifiable federal interest.28 8
However, when the issue before the court is not subject matter jurisdiction, but rather choice of law, the degree of federal interest required
need not be as high because the federal court already has jurisdiction

over the matter. The federal interest must still outweigh any applicable
state interest but need not meet the threshold required for a federal question. Once the case rises to the level of a multi-tort, the court has the
power to imply a federal rule of decision based on the policies and interests Congress intended to serve when it enacted the various statutes regulating toxic materials.
While concluding that the federal interests presented in "Agent Orange" were insufficient to support federal question jurisdiction, 28 9 the
Second Circuit nevertheless noted-perhaps anticipating the choice of
law problems that would be presented if the case reemerged 29 0 -that the

use of state law could threaten an "'identifiable' federal policy." 2 91 To
support its position, the court cited two Supreme Court private party
federal common law cases. 29 2 Significantly, the question in those cases
was not whether federal question subject matter jurisdiction existed, but
rather whether a federal common law rule should be created.2 93 The
majority concluded, however, that, as in those cases, the federal policy in

re "'Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 995, and that the one regulatory statute, see Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)), cited by the plaintiffs as a basis for such jurisdiction was insufficient to displace an "entire body of state product liability law." In re
"'AgentOrange," 635 F.2d at 995 n.14. That is different from asserting that federal interests exist to permit applying a federal rule in a choice of law analysis.
286. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972); Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 993-95.

287. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the DistrictCourts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 160-62 (1953) [hereinafter cited
as Mishkin III]. It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See
United States v. Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 31, 32 (1812); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
288. See In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 995.

289. See id. The Court also agreed with the district court that no implied right of
action existed under the statute. See id. at 989 n.3, 991 n.9.
290. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 695-701
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). See infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text.
291. In re 'Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 995 (emphasis added); see In re Diamond

Shamrock Chem. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 & n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067
(1984).
292. See In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 995 (citing Miree v. DeKalb County, 433
U.S. 25, 31-33 (1977) and Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
293. Miree, 433 U.S. at 28; Wallis, 384 U.S. at 67. See infra notes 310-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
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"'Agent Orange" was "not yet identifiable."'29 4
It is submitted here, however, that the federal interests were sufficiently identifiable for choice of law purposes because section 1407 was
used to transfer the Agent Orange cases to the Eastern District of New
York. 29 5 The district court, when presented with the case after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging diversity, had the power to apply federal common law. 296

In making its choice of law decision, the district court appeared to
believe it was constrained by the Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,2 97 Van Dusen v. Barrack,298 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 299

trilogy, which requires a transferee court to apply the substantive and
choice of law rules that the transferor court would have applied. 3°°
Moreover, the court believed that it was bound by the Second Circuit's
statement that the case was not governed by federal common law. 30 ' Despite these limitations, the court held that something called "national
consensus law" 3 2 -which can only be a euphemism for federal common
law-would apply to particular issues in the case.30 3 The following analysis will demonstrate that the court's instincts served it correctly, and
that its result is supportable under the analysis in this Article.
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the various competing interested states' policies cancel each other out such that a federal
rule should be considered. Because the plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of so many different jurisdictions, no one state's interest can be said
clearly to predominate. Next, the court should ask whether Congress
intended that a uniform rule be applied in the case. There are at least
two indications of congressional intent in the "Agent Orange" litigation.
First, the statute cited by plaintiffs3° ' as well as other statutes regulating
products similar to Agent Orange that may have been relied on by plaintiffs in other cases,30 5 suggests that Congress intended that such products
294. In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 995 (emphasis added).
295. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 695-96 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
296. See supra Part I.
297. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
298. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
299. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
300. See In re "Agent Orange," 580 F. Supp. at 692-93. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
301. See In re "Agent Orange," 580 F. Supp. at 695.
302. In re "Agent Orange," 580 F. Supp. at 713.
303. See id
304. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k
(1970) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)); See Inre "Agent Orange,"
635 F.2d at 989 n.3.
305. See supra note 45. In addition, there may be other statutes that evince Congress'
concern that parties be either compensated or protected. For example, in Inre "Agent
Orange," the defendants had argued that the Compensation for Service-Connected Disability or Death Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 310-362 (1982), which establishes basic compensation
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be held to a uniform minimum accepted level of safety. 3 6 Second, Congress' enactment of section 1407307 provides the basis for allowing a federal court to engage 0in8 a choice of law analysis in complex lawsuits such
as "Agent Orange.",3
Section 1407 helps explain why in the private party cases cited by the

Second Circuit, which involved neither a 1407 transfer nor interstate
harm of the kind presented in multi-tort litigation, the federal interests
were too remote or speculative to support applying federal common
law. 30 9 For example, in the first case cited by the "'AgentOrange" majority, Miree v. DeKalb County,3 1° the plaintiffs were representatives of passengers killed in a plane crash.3 1 ' They sued the county that operated
the airports, 3 2 and claimed to be third party beneficiaries of a contract
between the county and the Federal Aviation Administration. The contract provided that the county would restrict the use of the land surrounding the airport. 313 The question before the Court was whether
Georgia law or federal law applied to the issue of whether third party
beneficiary claims were barred by the county's governmental
immunity.3 14

Although holding that state law applied, the Court made clear that
even in private party cases there may be enough federal interests to consider applying federal common law:
[I]n deciding whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the
premises must first be specifically shown. It is by no means enough
that, as we may assume, Congress could under the constitution readily
enact a complete code of law governing transactions .... Whether
exercised to displace state law is primarlatent federal power should be
3 15
ily a decision for Congress.
for veterans, showed the total extent to which Congress intended veterans to be compensated. See In re "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 990 & n.7.
306. Cf Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106-08 (1972) (federal common law
used as basis for establishing minimal environmental standards).
307. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). See H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1898, 1900; Cahn, A Look at the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72 F.R.D. 211, 211 (1976); Herndon & Higginbotham,
Complex MultidistrictLitigation-An Overview of 28 U.S.C.§ 1407, 31 Baylor L. Rev. 33,
33 (1979).
308. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
309. See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
310. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
311. See id. at 26.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 27.
314. See id. at 27-28.
315. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis in original) (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,
384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). Significantly, the Miree Court decided the choice of law issue
without referring to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See
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In Miree,31 6 the Court concluded that any federal interest in the outcome of the question was "far too speculative, far too remote a possibility
to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of a
local concern. '3 17 In "'AgentOrange," there is much more than a "transaction essentially of a local concern. '3 18 No mere localized tort, such as

an aircrash case, is presented.3" 9 Moreover, the use of section 1407 en-

hances the interests presented by the relevant federal regulatory statutes
and justifies concluding that the supremacy of federal interests should
prevail over the inchoate state interests that might otherwise be relevant.
Finally, the salutory policy of section 1407,320 as well as that of any applicable federal regulatory statutes, 32 ' may be undermined if federal common law is ignored as a possible rule of law in a multi-tort case. Thus, in
the final analysis, the question is whether applying state law would conflict with either the remedial purposes of the federal regulatory scheme or
the federal interest in providing fair administration of justice in multitort cases.322 If the answer is yes, then the court should be free to imply
a federal rule of decision.
2. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
In Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,a23 the Fifth Circuit, sitting
en banc, ruled that a federal rule on punitive damages should not displace a state rule providing for such damages in a single-plaintiff asbestos
case. 324 Nine judges were in the majority; five dissented. 3" Like the
Miree, 433 U.S. at 28-33. Thus, whether federal law or state law applies is itself a question of federal law. Mishkin II, supra note 74, at 802 n.20.
316. See Miree, 433 U.S. at 32.
317. Id at 32-33. In his concurring opinion, Justice Burger disagreed. See id. at 35
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
318. Id at 33.
319. This Article does not propose that federal common law be applied in localized
tort cases, even when many persons are injured. In such cases it may be argued that the
one state in which the tort occurred should be the primary regulator of conduct unless
Congress expressly decides otherwise. Thus, this Article has no quarrel with the result in
a case like Overseas Nat'l Airways v. United States, 766 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1985), in
which the Second Circuit held that state law applied in an airplane crash case that involved the United States government's right of contribution. Similarly, federal common
law would not be appropriate in the Bhopal gas leak litigation unless other Union Carbide plants in the United States experience similar problems. See supra note 1. Although
all the plaintiff veterans were exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam, they were exposed at
different times and in different places. In re "Agent Orange," therefore, is not a localized
tort case.
320. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 45.
322. The test at this point should be whether the cause of action involves a violation of
a provision of a federal statute. If it does, to deny recovery would thwart the scheme.
Whether the denial resulted from a restrictive state statute of limitations or a punitive
damages recovery that could leave other plaintiffs without a recovery is irrelevant. The
argument simply is that a federal rule must be developed to prevent that occurrence.
323. 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
324. See id at 1326.
325. See id at 1315-16.
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majority in the Agent Orange case, the majority in Jackson acknowledged
the "massive,"-in other words, national-nature of the asbestos litigation confronting the federal courts. 32 6 According to the court, however,
that alone was not a basis for creating a federal rule. 327 The court also
rejected the interstate nature of the conflict as a rationale even though it
has been applied in cases such as Hinderliderv. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co. 32 ' and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.329 The Jackson
court did so because it concluded that the conflicts in those cases were
between discrete political entities.33 ° Second, according to the court, fed-

eral common law could not be fashioned because there was no "uniquely
'3 32
federal interest" 33 ' evidenced by "an articulated congressional policy.

Implicit in the majority's reasoning is that a uniquely federal interest
can be evidenced only by a statute created by Congress providing an injured plaintiff with the right to sue. 333 This ignores the possibility that
326. See id. at 1323.
327. See id.
328. 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
329. 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
330. See Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1324. The court was incorrect, however. Even though
City of Milwaukee involved "political entities," neither case was a state-to-state conflict
and Hinderliderinvolved a private party. See supra notes 210, 212-23 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these cases.
331. Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1324-25.
332. Id.
333. See id. The court cited Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984)
for support. See Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1325. However, Silkwood involved a different
question. In Silkwood, the defendant Kerr-McGee argued that because the Supreme
Court had ruled in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983), that Congress intended federal law to govern
the radiological safety aspects in the construction and operation of nuclear plants, and
therefore that federal law had preempted any state law falling into that area, state punitive damages law could not be applied in a case brought by the estate of a person allegedly
injured by exposure to radioactive material at defendant's plant. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at
249.
The Court held that state law could be applied because Congress had expressly preserved state law remedies for those injured in nuclear incidents. See id. at 255-56. The
Court did not consider whether federal common law could be applied. Rather it simply
applied the stringent standard for when state law can be entirely preempted. See id. at
248. The preemption standard, however, requires more than an implied authority on the
part of federal courts to create a federal rule. Rather, Congress must evidence a specific
intent to occupy a given field, id., or it must be implicit in the structure and purpose of
the federal act or regulation that Congress intended to displace totally state law or state
regulatory powers. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.Ct. 2380,
2388 (1985). The presumption is that Congress did not intend to totally displace state
law in areas of traditional state regulation. Id. at 2389. In comparing the quantum of
evidence of congressional intent that the federal courts create federal common law
against the evidence needed to show that federal statutory law has preempted state law,
the Supreme Court stated that "the same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest purpose
is not required" to show that a federal court has the power to fashion federal common
law. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981). Thus, in Silkwood, the
Court found that while there was congressional intent to preempt the question of safety
regulation, the states remained free to award damages based on their own laws of liability. 464 U.S. at 256. The Court suggested that if there is an "irreconcilable conflict

1985] MULTI-TORT CASES AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW

217

Congress has made policy on the substance in issue in other federal statutes, as it did on the water pollution issue in the City of Milvaukee litigations334 and as it has in the area of toxic substances. 335 From such
statutes, a court may infer or imply an appropriate legal rule to be applied in a case involving the product. 336 Moreover, it is Congress' provision of a useful procedural tool-section 1407-for achieving a just result
that triggers the opportunity for the court to create a federal rule in
multi-tort cases.3 37
Jackson, then, should serve as an invitation to the Multidistrict Litigation Panel to use section 1407 to solve the conflicts of law problems
between the federal and state standards" or if the application of state rules in a damages
action "would frustrate the objectives of the federal law," state law must yield. Id. The
Court in Silkwood found neither standard met. Id.
The result in Silkwood is not inconsistent with the approach used in this Article. In the
first place, Silkwood was a localized, two party tort case in which only one state's law was
potentially applicable. Thus, it was not the multi-tort case with which this Article is
concerned. Second, although the Court did not address whether federal common law
could have been applied or whether Silkwood's estate had an implied right of action
under the federal statute in issue, the Court left open the possibility that in appropriate
cases state law must yield to the policies implicit in the federal statute. Id. at 256. Finally, the application of federal common law by federal courts in multi-tort cases as proposed here does not result in the thwarting of a particular state's interests or in total
preemption of state law that would have been the case in Silkwood if the defendant's
argument had prevailed. See supra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
334. 406 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1972). See supra note 222.
335. See supra note 45.
336. See supra Part II and infra notes 355-71 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court's statement in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-19 (1981), that
federal common law no longer exists in the context of cases regulated by the FWPCA
does not suggest that federal common law may not be applied when a plaintiff brings a
suit in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The finding that there was no longer
a federal common law of nuisance in the area of interstate water pollution in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois and that there were no cognizable federal common law claims in
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 21-22,
deprived the federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The issue in those cases was
whether the cases arose under federal common law so that the court would have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In Jackson and the multi-tort cases with which this Article
is concerned, the issue is not jurisdiction, but rather choice of law. The federal courts will
have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, see supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text. Accordingly, federal preemption of the area in such a way as to deprive the federal courts of federal question jurisdiction does not preclude the federal
courts from applying federal common law in a case in which the court has proper jurisdiction under diversity and the plaintiffs have stated claims based on state law. Indeed,
§ 505(1) of the -VPCA expressly preserves the right of persons to seek available relief
under any other existing statute or the common law. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(1) (1982). The
plaintiffs have state common law causes of action for negligence or strict liability. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text. The question then is whether state law or a federally devised rule will govern the legal issues that arise. The argument here is that the
enforcement of divergent state standards or rules in multi-tort cases could undermine
Congress' intent that the federal acts be preemptive. Indeed, it makes no sense to argue
there can be no federal common law as a choice of law matter because a federal statute is
preemptive of state regulation, but there remains a right for private persons to seek relief
for damages only under state common law and state legal standards.
337. See supra notes 308, 320-22, infra notes 338-49 and accompanying text.
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presented in mass toxic tort litigations. 338 "Doing justice" may be an
inadequate criterion for permitting a federal court to engage in lawmaking in the single tort case, as the Fifth Circuit found. But, 20,000 cases
similar to Jackson were in the court system.339 The pervasiveness of the

problem shows the need for the federal courts to "do justice.

' 340

Had

the 20,000 cases been consolidated by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel,
the Fifth Circuit majority could not have ignored the express command
of Congress when it enacted section 1407 to use the statute to342
assure "the
'just and efficient' ,341 conduct of multidistrict proceedings.
Finally, when this inquiry is undertaken pursuant to section 1407 consolidation, the last problem raised by the Jackson court-application of
federal common law would open the way for each district to formulate a
new rule of law 34 3-disappears.
Because the Multidistrict Litigation
Panel transfers the cases, and future "tag along" cases 344 the insidious
forum shopping problem and "equal protection" concerns of the Erie
and Hanna Courts also disappears.34 5 Under this Article's analysis, the
decision of the district court handling the proceedings after a section
1407 transfer would provide the only federal rule. Thus the need for
uniformity is protected. 346 There would not be ninety-one 347 or twelve
338. The Multidistrict Litigation Panel did attempt to effect a § 1407 transfer. However, in In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp.
906 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977), the Multidistrict Litigation Panel vacated its order to show cause
why 103 asbestos actions pending in 19 federal districts should not be transferred to a
single district pursuant to § 1407. In that case, however, there was virtually unanimous
opposition to the transfer, id. at 910, for several reasons that need not cause concern in
future multi-tort cases. In the first place, the Panel has the power to transfer the cases in
the face of the parties' opposition. Id. Second, the Panel cited good reasons for refusing
the transfer; many of the actions were in an advanced stage of pretrial preparation, id. at
909-10, and there was a lack of commonality among the parties. Id.
In future cases, the Panel, after learning that a particular product or substance has
become the subject of a rising number of lawsuits, should act quickly to consolidate the
actions. New cases can be transferred as they are filed. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 9, 10, 78 F.R.D. 561, 567-68 (1978); see In re Swine
Flu, 464 F. Supp. 949, 951-52 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979). In addition, if it appears that there are
different classes of plaintiffs or defendants, the Panel should consider consolidating parallel actions.
339. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1985)
(en banc).
340. See id. at 1325-26.
341. H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 1898, 1899. See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of
congressional policy.
342. In fact, § 1407 is an important vehicle enabling federal courts to do justice. See
In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 736 (C.D. Cal. 1975); In re
Pennsylvania Life Co. Sec. Litig., 389 F. Supp. 981, 983 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving Fourth Class Postage, 298 F. Supp. 1326, 1327
(J.P.M.D.L. 1969).
343. See Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1325-27.
344. See supra note 338.
345. See supra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
346. This is because, practically speaking, the case will be disposed of by the transferee
court. See supra note 246.
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other federal rules competing with the fifty state rules." s Admittedly, the
task of determining the content of the federal rule may not be easy, but
the common law as expressed by the courts has always been the primary
source of tort rules. 4
347. There are 91 district courts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (1982).
348. There are thirteen federal courts of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982). The Federal Circuit, however, does not have jurisdiction over private tort cases. Nevertheless,
according to Jackson, the twelve circuits having jurisdiction could formulate different
rules. See Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1326.
349. Indeed, the common law that has developed is preferable to any statutory solution
because it "has a rational sense built on the foundation of centuries of tort law." Twerski
& Weinstein, A Critiqueof the Uniform ProductsLiability Lawv--A Rush to Judgment, 28
Drake L. Rev. 221, 222 (1978); see also Ursin, JudicialCreativity and Tort Law, 49 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 229, 246-50 (1981) (courts are competent to decide complex social policy
issues). The proposed federal tort legislation has been criticized for similar reasons.
Spacone, The Emergence of Strict Liability: A HistoricalPerspectiveand Other Considerations, Including Senate 100, 8 J. Prods. Liab. 1, 2 (1985) (S. 100 will be only a partial
solution because it will have a very limited impact on activist state courts that attempt
"to shape tort law to satisfy what they perceive[d] to be the needs of society and the value
and beliefs of America itself embodied in juries"); see also Rheingold, The Expanding
Liability of the Product Supplier A Primer, 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 521, 523-26 (1974) (discussing various elements of the cause of action derived from the common law); Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products,44 Miss. L.J. 825, 828-38, 841-48 (1973)
(outlining the type of conduct that will subject a supplier to strict liability). See generally
G. Calabresi, supra note 277, at 1-7, 31-32 (discussing how an American jurisprudence,
so deeply rooted in the common law approach, has reacted to the "orgy of statute making" (quoting G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 95 (1977)). Common law rules
are preferable to statutory solutions also because more objective criteria are the basis of
decision. Statutes are commonly enacted because some interest groups have sufficient
political power to ensure the passage of an act that will provide them with particular
benefits. See P. Rubin, Business Firms and the Common Law 166 (1983) (citing Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell, J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971)); Kau &
Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L & Econ.
365, 366-67 (1982); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L &
Econ. 211, 212-13 (1976). Many states, however, are adopting products liability statutes.
See, e-g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-21-401 to -406 (Supp. 1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 52-572m to -572r (West Supp. 1984); Idaho Code §§ 6-1401-1409 (Supp. 1984). See
generally R. Herrmann, An Overview of State Statutory Products Liability Law in 1983
Trial Lawyers Guide 1 (discussing various states' product liability statutes).
Nevertheless, the conflicting state and private interests seem to render it virtually impossible for Congress to fashion a sensible statutory rule. See Spacone, supra, at 1-2. In
light of this, it is not surprising that Congress has been unable to enact a federal products
liability act. The latest version of a Federal Product Liability Bill is S.100, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2,131 Cong. Rec. S 218 (Jan. 3, 1985). For a general discussion of the Bill, see
Spacone, supra, at 1-2, 37-40. The argument here is that the federal court should develop
rules based on the policies underlying federal regulatory statutes for adjudicating multitort cases until Congress acts. Indeed, a "vital Court task, after all, is the interpretation
of legislation... free from ulterior purposes .... [This will] be impaired if... the Court
... invoke[s] an often spurious legislative intent to promote the Court-Congress colloquoy.... ; Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues'-A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1964). Indeed, the scope of
judicial interpretation of existing regulatory statutes should be exceedingly broad, for
frequently no single interpretation is manifestly right because vagueness in crucial statutory terms or in legislative history will often be a prerequisite to obtaining approval from
all the groups that could block enactment, as in the case in the Federal Products Liability
Bill, see S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 131 Cong. Rec. S 218 (Jan. 3, 1985). There, the
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Should the courts go too far, by either misreading the policy underlying a federal statute, or by excessively encroaching on viable state interests, Congress can enact an explicit statute more clearly defining the
legislative scheme, as it did in the City of Milwaukee.350 Once Congress
enacted a comprehensive scheme, the federal common law rules that the
Supreme Court had formulated to give the Court jurisdiction and to provide a cause of action had to yield.3 51 It is not enough to say that Congress alone is responsible for balancing competing interests. Indeed, in
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative,3 52 and in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,35 3 the Court recognized that this was a function of the federal
courts as well. 35' Therefore, until Congress enacts a comprehensive federal products liability and toxic tort compensation act, the federal courts
should accept their responsibility and exercise their implicit authority to
create federal rules of decision in multi-tort cases.
3. A Not So Hypothetical Case
To sketch how this approach would work, the following facts are posited: the defendant New York corporation is a company that processes

toxic waste. It has grown dramatically since it was founded in 1950 with
one plant in a small town in upstate New York. The defendant now has
federal court's choice can "honestly" be made to further the appropriate functions of the
law. Cf G. Calabresi, supra note 277, at 32 ("[Ain equally plausible function.., is the
updating of laws, the avoidance of the 'legislative deep freeze.' ").
350. See supra notes 212-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
351. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
352. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
353. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
354. See City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 106-07; Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536-39. Implied
right of action cases are a sign of judicial concern that Congress' express statutory command is not complete. See supra note 239. Certainly, then, to argue for an implied rule
of federal law from express statutory scheme is not a novel idea. See supra notes 159-93
and accompanying text discussing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957); see G. Calabresi, supra note 77, at 11; Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose
and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15 n.59, 19-20
(1957); Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221, 262 (1973). If a plaintiff is properly in federal
court under § 1332, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), which provides for diversity jurisdiction, or
some other jurisdictional statute on a state created cause of action, the court should imply
a remedy from the policy embodied in the federal regulatory statute. Cf Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 106 (1945) ("[flederal court[s] may afford an equitable remedy
for a substantive right recognized by a State even though a State court cannot give it").
The penumbra of the federal regulatory scheme, see supra note 178 and accompanying
text, provides the basis for developing a rule which will result in providing a remedy.
With current thinking about the availability of relief for toxic tort changing, see supra
note 6 and accompanying text, and because of Congress' legislative inertia with respect to
private damage actions, see supra note 349, the federal courts should create common law
rules until Congress modifies its regulatory statutes to make its intent clear. Cf G. Calabresi, supra note 277, at 10 ("the statute was probably out of phase with current thinking
...and probably remained in force only because of legislative inertia") (citing Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.9 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (agencies should fill in
gaps left by legislative inertia); Friendly II, supra note 277, at 805 (1977).
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plants in 34 states throughout the country. In 1983, numerous residents
of the small upstate town noticed an increasing and abnormally high rate
of various cancers. Shortly thereafter, residents near the other plants noticed a similar pattern. Individual lawsuits were subsequently filed in
state court in New York and federal courts in 34 other states alleging
negligence on the part of the defendant that led to the cancers. The
plaintiffs include persons who had developed the cancers who sought
damages, as well as others who sought injunctive relief. What should
happen next?
First, it is proposed that the Multidistrict Litigation Panel consolidate
all the federal actions pursuant to section 1407. Once the actions are
transferred to a specific district court, the plaintiffs should consider proceeding as a class action so that New York plaintiffs could be made members of the class, thus eliminating the need for a parallel state proceeding.
In addition, any subsequent cases can be transferred and the results of
discovery shared.3 5 Assuming these efficiencies are achieved, the question then becomes whether state law or federal law should apply.
Under the test proposed in Part I, the rights and liabilities of the parties cannot be said to arise out of any particular state's law. Rather, the
potentially conflicting state policies underlying the interested states' rules
would cancel each other out such that no "substantive" law issues are
presented for Erie purposes. Accordingly, the federal court to which the
cases have been transferred may consider whether there is any implied
authority to create a federal rule to apply instead of the otherwise relevant state rules.
The court could look to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),35 6 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).35 7 A reading of the legislative history of these acts would show that Congress enacted them to
mitigate some of the problems caused by hazardous waste sites.358 The
court, therefore, could find that the Acts evidenced congressional intent
that remedies be provided to those injured by incidents involving hazardous wastes.
However, CERCLA provides no explicit private remedy for personal
injuries." 9 In fact, the legislative history indicates that a provision allowing a private right to sue for personal injuries was considered but not
incorporated into the Act. 3" This does not suggest that the Act fails to
355. See, e.g., In re Swine Flu, 464 F. Supp. 949, 951-52, 954 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
356. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
357. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
358. See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.NJ. 1983) (CERCLA is
"unique attempt by Congress to mitigate some of the problems caused by inactive hazardous waste sites"); H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 6238, 6241.
359. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (i), (6)(1982); id. § 961 1(a)(ii), j), (1).
360. Senate Debates on Stafford-Randolph Substitute to S. 1480, Nov. 24, 1980, 126
Cong. Rec. 30,897-987 [hereinafter cited as Senate Debates]; see also id. at 30,941 (re-
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provide a basis for fashioning a federal common law rule. Rather, the
court could look to Section 107(i) of CERCLA, which provides that
"[n]othing in this paragraph shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liability of any person under any other provision of State or Federal law, including common law, for damages, injury, or loss resulting
from a release of any hazardous substance ....
From this provision,
it may be inferred that Congress intended that the courts fill in the gaps
left open by the Act. Indeed, in describing the necessity for CERCLA,
Congress noted that the Act was necessary to fill in some of the gaps left
by other federal statutes.36 2 CERCLA, however, was hastily drafted.363
Accordingly, there is no committee report of definitive legislative history
defining the Act's scope.3 64 Therefore, a court must conclude that Congress intended that the courts exercise their preexisting power to apply
state law or to fashion a federal common law rule, when appropriate,
based on its reading of congressional intent.
Moreover, there is no City of Milwaukee365 problem because there is
no expression that Congress intended CERCLA to entirely preempt the
area. 3 66 Further support of legislative intent is found when CERCLA is
read together with the provisions of the RCRA for injunctive relief and
citizen suits. 367 Congress has interpreted the predecessor to section 6973
as a codification of the common law of nuisance. 368 There is some support for the view that Congress failed to include a federal cause of action
for damages simply as a compromise. 369 Rather than risk losing passage
of an Act providing for clean-up, advocates of a federal private remedy
decided to avoid the controversy such a scheme would generate.3 70 Congress, however, did not intend to leave private litigants without a remedy
for personal injuries. Rather, a savings clause was provided that preserves the right to sue under "State or Federal law, including common
marks of Sen. Mitchell) ("[T]his bill is deficient because while it provides for the cleanup
of places, and compensation for damage to things, it provides nothing for what is the
most important part of the problem: injury to people. The guiding principle of those
who wrote S. 1480 was that those found responsible for harm caused by chemical contamination should pay for the costs of that harm. We are abandoning that principle here
today when the damage involved is to a person.").

361. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i) (1982).
362. See H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code

Cong. & Ad. News 6119, 6119-25.
363. See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983).

364. Id.
365. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
366. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113 n.3 (D.
Minn. 1982). But see United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983).
367. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972-6973 (1982).
368. See S. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5019, 5023.
369. See Senate Debates, supra note 359, at 30,952; (remarks of Sen. Culver); id. at
30,941-942 (remarks of Sen. Mitchell); id. at 30,942-943 (remarks of Sen. Stafford).
370. Id.
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law. ' 371 To refuse to allow the courts to fashion a federal rule to enforce
the policy underlying the federal act would in essence create a gap in the
enforcement scheme that Congress did not intend. In fact, some lower
courts have found that federal common law should be applied in cases to
which CERCLA and RCRA may apply. 3 2 Allowing federal common
law to apply will have the effect of promoting the remedial purposes of
CERCLA. That is, Congress' intent that toxic waste sites be cleaned
upI 3 will be promoted because corporations will be more inclined to sign
consent agreements with the Environmental Protection Agency requiring
an immediate clean-up so that future personal injury actions will be
avoided as well as the uncertainty that accompanies litigation when various states' rules are applicable.
CONCLUSION

The presence of relevant federal regulatory statutes, in addition to the
national scope of the harm and the availability of a section 1407 transfer,
compels a federal court to engage in a choice of law analysis that considers the propriety of creating a federal rule in multi-tort cases. The court
should first determine whether the policies of any of the interested states
essentially cancel each other out. If so, it should next explore whether
applying a federal rule offends a particular state's interest or undermines
the twin purposes of Erie. Finally, a court should analyze whether federal interests evoked by federal statutes outweigh state interests. If they
do, the court should create and apply a federal rule on the issue.
This Article's proposal to allow federal courts to consider whether a
federal rule should be applied to particular issues when a multi-tort case
has been transferred pursuant to section 1407 will not unduly interfere
with the development of state law. Indeed, it is not proposed that federal
common law must apply in state court actions. Rather the Article suggests a choice of law analysis that would permit only the federal courts
hearing a case after a section 1407 transfer to consider the distinctly national aspects of the case.
We need not fear forum shopping or the kind of unequal administration of law discussed in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins3 "4 that provided the
basis for Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 3 5 and Van
Dusen v. Barracks37 6 because the Multidistrict Litigation Panel, not the
parties, chooses the federal court to which the case would be transferred,
and because multi-tort cases are not simple two party actions. The
371. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1982).
372. See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (S.D.
Ill. 1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
373. See H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 6238, 6241.
374. 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
375. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
376. 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964).
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courts should engage in a choice of law analysis that requires them to
measure competing state interests, as well as federal interests evidenced
by statutes and the need to treat litigants fairly, to determine whether
state law or a federal rule should be applied. This kind of analysis is
always necessary to resolve choice of law questions and is no more burdensome in this context than in any other. Finally, although adopting
this approach may lead some litigants to choose a federal forum, the
more insidious form of state-to-state forum shopping will probably be
eliminated in most cases. The federal courts will thus be in the best position to provide a fair resolution of the myriad problems raised in mass
toxic tort litigation.

